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Chapter 1
Introduction
The analysis of monetary and scal policy belongs to the central issues in
macroeconomics. This thesis provides new insights concerning current mon-
etary and scal policy issues by accounting for the role of housing. Recent
studies focusing on the interplay of housing and the macroeconomy have
outlined the importance of housing along several dimensions, like for busi-
ness cycles or asset pricing.1 This thesis analyzes the implications of housing
for the conduct of monetary and scal policy. In the models used in this
thesis, the importance of housing stems from its usage as collateral in the
presence of nancial market imperfections. When debt repayment cannot
be enforced, lenders will request collateral from borrowers. This collateral
is typically the house of a borrower. In such a borrower-lender framework
underlying each chapter of this thesis, we study the following policy issues.
First, we analyze in chapter 2 the preferential tax treatment of hous-
ing, like the deductibility of mortgage interest payments from income that
is observed in many industrialized countries. Housing subsidies are shown
to be optimal once one accounts for the role of housing as collateral. Sec-
ond, we quantify in chapter 3 that is coauthored with Andreas Schabert the
macroeconomic e¤ects of the Federal Reserves (Fed) purchases of mortgage-
1Research on the interplay of housing and the macroeconomy has gained much atten-
tion in recent years. Two recent economics handbooks, The Handbook of Regional and
Urban Economics, Volume 5 (2015), and The Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 2
(forthcoming), devote a chapter to this topic.
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Figure 1.1: Household Wealth, Household Debt, and GDP (in $billions of
2009). Following Iacoviello (2010), we compute housing wealth as the sum
of the market value of owner-occupied and rented homes. Data are from the
Federal Reserves Flow of Funds Accounts. All data are deated.
backed securities, which is one of the unconventional policy measures the Fed
used for the rst time in its history during the nancial crisis. We nd that
the purchases fostered economic activity. Third, chapter 4 provides a theo-
retical framework with occasionally binding collateral constraints in which
government spending is more e¤ective in recessions compared to expansions
consistent with what is found by recent empirical research. Moreover, based
on this framework we quantify the di¤erences between government spending
multipliers in recessions and expansions and nd that these are considerably
large.
Figure 1 underlines the importance of housing as component of wealth
and in serving as collateral for private loans. We subdivide total household
wealth into housing wealth (solid line) and non-housing wealth. We nd
that in the US housing wealth accounted for about 40% of total household
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wealth on average between 1950 and 2014 with a maximum of 48% in 2005.
Moreover, the ratio of housing wealth to annual GDP (dashed line) was 1.4
on average and 2.3 when it reached its maximum in 2005. Further, total
household debt (dotted line) made up 56% of annual GDP on average, with a
maximum of almost 100% in 2007, while total mortgage debt (dashed-dotted
line) amounted to 38% of GDP on average with a maximum of 73% again in
2007. The ratios of total household debt to GDP and total mortgage debt
to GDP as well as the ratio of total mortgage debt to total household debt
increased over time. Houses served as collateral for about 70% of the total
debt of US households on average between 1950 and 2014. While in 1950
this number was 60%, in 2009 it reached its maximum of 76%. Housing as
collateral for private debt has thus gained in importance.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between housing wealth and con-
sumption. It shows the annual percentage changes of housing wealth (solid
line), aggregate consumption (dashed line), and non-durable consumption
(dotted line) for 1960-2014. As the gure suggests, consumption is corre-
lated with housing wealth. The unconditional contemporaneous correlation
between aggregate consumption and housing wealth is 0.53 and between
non-durable consumption and housing wealth is 0.3.
As will be discussed below, one possible explanation for this correlation
of consumption and housing wealth is the collateral e¤ect. As Figure 1
has made clear, private debt is widely collateralized by housing. Hence, if
housing wealth changes, this means that the value of collateral and thereby
the borrowing capacity of households changes, which in turn a¤ects their
consumption possibilities. This collateral e¤ect can be of large importance
for the transmission of monetary and scal policy, especially when a policy
a¤ects housing wealth, which may lead to an amplication of the initial
e¤ect of the policy measure. Since typically borrowers have a high marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth this amplication may be large.
The reaction of consumption plays a crucial role for the transmission of
monetary and scal policy. While in neoclassical dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models based on optimizing representative agents
and exible prices, in which consumption is a function of permanent income,
3
Figure 1.2: Housing Wealth and Consumption. Annual Percentage Changes.
monetary and scal policy are largely ine¤ective, Keynesian models, in which
consumption depends on current disposable income, imply large e¤ects of
those. Due to these contradictory predictions of the traditional theories,
the New Neoclassical Synthesis(NNS) integrated Keynesian price sticki-
ness into neoclassical DSGE models with optimizing representative agents.
Goodfriend and King (1997) and Linnemann and Schabert (2003) are early
examples for the analysis of monetary and scal policy, respectively, within
these types of frameworks, also called New Keynesian DSGE models.
This approach relaxed the assumption of exible prices in DSGE mod-
els, while another strand in the literature relaxed the assumption of one
representative agent to better describe the behavior of aggregate consump-
tion and hence to better understand the e¤ectiveness of monetary and scal
policy. This strand developed theoretical models based on the study of
aggregate consumption behavior following the Euler equation approach of
Hall (1978), who derived an Euler equation from the optimizing behavior
of a representative rational agent. His theoretical conclusion that the (mar-
ginal utility of) consumption follows a random walk with trend and cannot
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be predicted by lagged variables other than consumption was rejected by
the data. To better t the data, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) considered
a model in which half of the households are optimizing and the other half
are rule-of-thumb households, who consume all their disposable income in
each period. They found that their model can better explain the behavior of
aggregate consumption. In a model with such a household sector, Mankiw
(2000) analyzed scal policy in his famous savers-spenders theory. Based
on this framework, several papers analyzed scal as well monetary policy in-
tegrating rule-of-thumb households in NNS models with sticky prices.2 One
can conclude that the inclusion of rule-of-thumb households into the NNS
framework has substantial implications for monetary as well as scal policy.
Finally, based on the work of Zeldes (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Iacoviello (2004) derived an aggregate Euler equation from a model
in which a fraction of households are collateral constrained and their debt is
collateralized by housing. Compared to the assumption that rule-of-thumb
households have no access to credit markets at all and hence neither save
nor borrow, the collateral constraint can be interpreted as an endogenous
outcome in the absence of debt enforcement. Iacoviello (2004) found that
the value of collateral, i.e. housing, has a non-negligible e¤ect on aggregate
consumption through the borrowing capacity of households, as suggested by
Figure 2. A general equilibrium version of this model with sticky prices,
presented in Iacoviello (2005), conrmed this nding.3 This new generation
of NNS models with household heterogeneity and nancial market imper-
fections was as well recently used for the analysis of monetary and scal
policy.4 The inclusion of collateral constrained borrowers implies an impor-
tant e¤ect the collateral or housing wealth e¤ect that was ignored in the
2See e.g. Gali et al. (2004), Coenen and Straub (2005), Gali et al. (2007), Cogan et
al. (2010), Cwik and Wieland (2011), and Coenen et al. (2013).
3 Iacoviello (2010) illustrates the relationship between housing wealth and consumption
in a theoretical framework and reviews existing empirical literature. He concludes that
a considerable portion of the e¤ect of housing wealth on consumption could reect the
inuence of changes in housing wealth on borrowing against such wealth. (p. 11). For
further studies on this issue see e.g. Case et al. (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2007),
Carroll et al. (2011), and Mian and Su (2011).
4See e.g. Monacelli (2008, 2009), Calza et al. (2013), Khan and Reza (2013), Schabert
(2014), and Andres et al. (2014, 2015).
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previous models.
In each chapter of this thesis, we consider models, which incorporate
household sectors consisting of lenders and borrowers who face a collateral
constraint. Accounting for the role of housing as collateral, we provide stud-
ies concerning current monetary and scal policy issues ranging from subsi-
dization of housing, over the Feds purchases of mortgage-backed securities
to the di¤erent levels of e¤ectiveness of government spending in recessions
and expansions.
The second chapter of this thesis deals with one important issue concern-
ing housing, namely its preferential tax treatment, which can be observed in
many industrialized countries. In the US, for instance, total housing subsi-
dies added up to 220 billion dollars in 2011, corresponding to 1.5% of GDP.
We nd that these subsidies can be justied by means of an optimal taxation
approach. We study optimal taxation of housing in the presence of collat-
eral constraints and nd that it is optimal to subsidize housing of collateral
constrained households to disburden them. This result can be understood
as a rationale for the preferential tax treatment of housing. Since the sub-
sidy is nanced to the largest extent by a housing tax on patient savers it
can be interpreted as redistribution from wealth-rich lenders to wealth-poor
borrowers.
As reference case, we also consider a representative agent version of the
model, which provides intuitive results that are in line with the principle
of optimal taxation that goods with lower elasticities should be taxed at a
higher rate, which turns out to be housing in the baseline calibration. Hence,
the housing tax rate is positive in the representative agent version, while it
is negative for constrained households in the full version. The main result
of optimal housing subsidies for constrained households is robust to several
parameter variations. This chapter provides a rationale for housing subsidies
based on capital market imperfections. In contrast, previous studies have
focused on externalities accompanied with homeownership, like its impact
on the education of children (Green and White, 1997), which should be
internalized through these subsidies. In that sense, it adds a new dimension
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on this issue and indicates a new path for future research.
The third chapter analyzes an unconventional policy measure the pur-
chases of mortgage-backed securities (MBS)  that has been used by the
Fed for the rst time in its history. To counteract the e¤ects of the nancial
crisis on the economy, the Fed implemented unconventional policy measures,
like large-scale asset purchases, also called quantitative easing (QE), since it
hit the zero lower bound on the policy rate in the aftermath of the nancial
crisis.
We analyze the macroeconomic e¤ects of these purchases, which added
up to more than $2 trillion in both MBS purchase programs conducted in the
rst and third round of quantitative easing programs, henceforth referred to
as QE1 and QE3. We nd that they had considerable expansionary e¤ects
on output, consumption and prices providing a rationale for this new type
of policy measure.
The analysis of MBS purchases is conducted within a theoretical frame-
work to better understand the mechanisms through which they a¤ect macro-
economic variables. Moreover, since it is the rst time that such a policy
is conducted, data on it are scarce. To this end, we develop a New Key-
nesian DSGE model with banks conducting costly nancial intermediation.
Intermediation costs increase in the amount of loans, which are granted to
impatient households and collateralized by housing and hence can be inter-
preted as MBS and decrease in the amount of reserves, which are supplied
by the central bank only in exchange for eligible assets. Besides government
bonds, with the announcement of the purchase program during QE1 also
MBS became eligible. Hence, by purchasing MBS, the central bank can in-
uence MBS yields, which in turn has e¤ects on the behavior of households
and banks.
We calibrate the model to US data and to empirical evidence on yield ef-
fects of the observed MBS purchases. Based on this calibration, we compute
the e¤ects of the observed MBS purchases in QE1 and QE3. We nd ex-
pansionary e¤ects of the purchases on macroeconomic aggregates, like GDP,
consumption, employment, and ination. MBS purchases imply a positive
wealth e¤ect with regard to impatient borrowers since they reduce MBS
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yields and increase house prices as well as ination. This enables impatient
households to borrow more and hence to increase consumption and housing.
The e¤ectiveness of the program in stimulating consumption, employment
and GDP lies in the fact that it a¤ects those households that have a high
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
In particular, our results indicate that MBS purchases during QE1 led
to maximum quarterly increases in GDP, consumption, and employment of
1.12%, 1.13%, and 1.67%, respectively, and to cumulative increases of 2.24%,
2.36%, and 3.36%, respectively. For QE3, we nd that the program led to
maximum quarterly increases in GDP of 0.86%, in consumption of 0.85%,
and in employment of 1.28%. The cumulative increases were 1.62%, 1.69%,
and 2.43%, respectively. The smaller e¤ects of QE3 are due to the smaller
size of the program. We further conclude that central bank asset purchases
have counteracted deationary e¤ects from the crisis shock.
The analysis in chapter 4 is motivated by growing empirical evidence
indicating that scal policy is more e¤ective in recessions compared to ex-
pansions. It provides a theoretical model with occasionally binding collateral
constraints that illustrates a mechanism that makes government spending
less e¤ective in expansions. Based on this model, we then quantify the
di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of government spending in recessions and ex-
pansions.
We again consider a household sector consisting of patient lenders and
collateral constrained impatient borrowers. The collateral constraint plays
a crucial role since it is not always binding but occasionally, which leads
to a non-linearity. In particular, the collateral constraint becomes slack in
expansions, while it binds in recessions. We compute government spending
multipliers for expansions and recessions and nd that a scal stimulus is
more e¤ective in a recession than in an expansion. The intuition for this
result is that in expansions the collateral constraint that impatient house-
holds face is slack. A slack collateral constraint means that the household
is at its unconstrained optimum and hence largely insensitive to changes
in disposable income. On the contrary, in recessions, impatient households
nd themselves at their borrowing limit, which means that they consume
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less than they would if they could borrow more. Thus, in recessions, their
decisions are substantially a¤ected by their disposable income.
Calibrating the model to US data, we nd an impact multiplier of 1.6
in an average recession and of 1 in an average expansion. Moreover, the
cumulative multiplier for 1 year (2 years) is about 1.5 (1.2) in recessions,
whereas the corresponding multiplier is about 0.9 (0.7) in expansions. We
provide sensitivity analyses for a large range for key parameters and nd that
the di¤erences in recession and expansion multipliers remain considerably
large.
To summarize, the studies in this thesis emphasize the importance of
housing for monetary and scal policy, especially in serving as collateral for
private loans. They show how accounting for this role of housing provides
novel insights concerning current monetary and scal policy issues ranging
from housing subsidies, over the Feds MBS purchases to the e¤ectiveness
of government spending in recessions and expansions.
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Chapter 2
Housing, Collateral
Constraints, and Fiscal
Policy
2.1 Introduction
Housing is subject to a preferential tax treatment in many industrialized
countries. In the US, total housing subsidies added up to 220 billion dollars
in 2011, corresponding to 1.5% of GDP (US Budget, 2011). Also in Euro-
pean countries the values of total housing subsidies in percent of GDP were
in that range, e.g. 0.9% in Germany, 1.1% in France and 1.4% in Spain in
2000 (ECB, 2003).
The two most important housing subsidies are the deductibility of mort-
gage interest payments from income and the tax exemption of imputed rents
on owner-occupied housing. In the US, the former amounted to 105 billion
dollars while the latter added up to 38 billion dollars in 2011 (US Budget,
2011). These two subsidies accounted for 65% of total housing subsidies.
However, the view of economists on this preferential tax treatment of
housing is controversial. On the one hand, it is criticized by researchers
like Poterba (1992) and Gervais (2002), among others, who argue that this
treatment leads to a welfare loss since it distorts investment decisions of in-
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dividuals towards housing. These studies are in line with Rosen who writes
in the Handbook of Public Economics that paternalism and political con-
siderations seem to be the sources of this policy(1985, p. 380).
On the other hand, there are proponents of this treatment who argue
that homeownership is accompanied with externalities which are internal-
ized through these subsidies. For instance, Green and White (1997) stress
the positive impact of homeownership on the education of children and Di-
Pasquale and Glaeser (1999) state that homeowners are better citizensin
the sense that they are more involved in local organizations.
In contrast to these papers, this chapter gives a rationale for housing
subsidies based on market imperfections.1 We assume that private loans are
not enforceable and, therefore, have to be collateralized by housing. Looking
at the data makes the importance of housing as a component of wealth and
the relevance of its usage as collateral clear. First, housing makes up a large
part of total household wealth as well as total national wealth. In the US,
housing wealth accounts for almost half of total household wealth and is
larger than annual GDP with an average ratio of housing wealth to GDP
of about 1.5 from 1952-2008 (Iacoviello, 2009). Secondly, in 2010 residential
mortgage debt amounted to 77% of GDP in the US and to 47% in Germany,
to 41% in France and to 64% in Spain (Hypostat, 2010). To the best of
our knowledge, this work is the rst one that studies optimal taxation of
housing in the presence of collateral constraints.
The structure of the model is as follows. We consider a household sector
that relates to Kiyotaki and Moores (1997) model with two types of agents
who di¤er in their discount factors, patient and impatient ones. Due to this
di¤erence in patience we get lenders, the patient agents, and borrowers, the
impatient ones, in equilibrium. While for the former the collateral constraint
is irrelevant in equilibrium, it is of importance for the latter. As in Iacoviello
(2005), housing plays a dual role for households. First, it delivers utility
to the agents together with consumption and leisure and secondly, private
loans are collateralized by housing. The government, that is assumed to have
1This chapter is based on Polattimur (2013b). A shortened version was published as
Polattimur (2013a).
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access to a commitment technology, has exogenous expenditures that have
to be nanced by two taxes, a housing property tax that can di¤er for the
two types of agents and a labor income tax. The di¤erent housing tax rates
for the two types can be understood as follows. The patient households for
whom the collateral constraint is irrelevant will always own a larger house
than the impatient ones and, therefore, are taxed at another rate than the
impatient and hence wealth-poor agents.
The main result of this chapter is that it provides a rationale for hous-
ing subsidies. In the presence of collateral constraints, optimal scal policy
should subsidize housing of the impatient households, for whom the col-
lateral constraint is relevant, to disburden them. This subsidy has to be
nanced to the largest extent by a housing tax on the patient households
and to a smaller part by a labor income tax. Hence, this can be interpreted
as redistribution from wealth-rich patient households with a higher housing
stock to wealth-poor impatient households with a lower housing stock.
The main result of housing subsidies for impatient households is robust
to several parameter variations and can be attributed for the most part to
the collateral constraint. To illustrate this point, we analyze the e¤ects of
the discount rate di¤erence of the types of agents on housing subsidies in
comparison to the e¤ects of the collateral constraint, with the result that
the former plays a minor role.
We also consider a representative agent version of the model as reference
case. Thereby we can understand how the inclusion of a durable good,
housing, per se a¤ects optimal scal policy compared to standard models.
Furthermore, this allows us to compare the results of the representative
agent version to existing literature. The representative agent version delivers
intuitive results that are in line with the principle of optimal taxation that
goods with lower elasticities should be taxed at a higher rate. For the
benchmark calibration, this turns out to be housing and, hence, the housing
tax rate is positive in the representative agent version, while it is negative
for collateral constrained agents in the full version.
This study further relates to the work of Eerola and Määttänen (2009)
that considers optimal taxation of housing in a dynamic representative agent
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model with fairly general preferences and an extended tax system compared
to the model of this chapter. However, the results of the representative
agent version of our model are compatible with their results. Another closely
related paper is Monacelli (2008) that considers a model with two types of
agents with di¤erent patience rates and collateral constraints similar to the
one of this chapter. While Monacelli analyzes optimal monetary policy in
that framework, he points out that also the analysis of optimal scal policy
in such a model would be of interest, which is done in this chapter.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the model
with two types of agents, rms and the government is described, the Ramsey
problem is set up and the equilibrium conditions for the steady state are
derived. In Section 2.3, the results for the full as well as the representative
agent version are presented and a sensitivity analysis is given. Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 The Model
In this section, we present the model with a household sector consisting of
two types of agents, a production sector consisting of two types of rms and
the government. Concerning the household sector, we follow Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), who pioneered the models with two types of agents, patient
and impatient ones, resulting in an equilibrium with lenders and borrowers.
We assume that private debt contracts are not enforceable and have to be
collateralized by housing as in Iacoviello (2005). Therefore, a household can
only borrow up to a fraction m of his expected end of period housing wealth.
Additionally to its usage as collateral, housing delivers utility together with
consumption and leisure.
Like in Favilukis et al. (2012), we consider a two-sector production side,
such that both housing demand and supply are modeled explicitly. There are
two types of rms, one of which produces non-durable consumption goods
and the other durable housing.
The government levies a at-rate tax on labor income and a housing
property tax that can di¤er for the two types of agents and issues one-period
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bonds to nance an exogenous stream of government expenditures. It has
no access to lump-sum taxes. The reason why housing tax rates can di¤er
is that a patient household will own a larger house than an impatient one.
Hence, rather than taxing degrees of patience di¤erently, we can understand
this as taxing the ones with a larger house at a higher rate than the ones
with a smaller house. Due to the usage of housing as collateral that is only
relevant for the borrowers, who will be the impatient agents in equilibrium,
we will see that the housing tax rates will di¤er markedly.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households consisting of two types, patient and
impatient ones. They di¤er in their discount factors 1 >  > 0 > 0
with  being the discount factor of patient and 0 of impatient households.
Henceforth, variables of patient (impatient) households are denoted without
(with) a prime, while aggregate variables are denoted with a superscript T
(e.g. cTt , for total consumption). The population share of patient households
is s. Borrowing between the two types of households is modeled as follows.
A household can borrow an amount bt1+rt 1 < 0 in period t   1 and has to
pay back bt in period t, where rt 1 is the real interest rate on loans between
t 1 and t. Since we assume that private debt contracts are not enforceable,
there is a limit on private debt given by a fraction m of the expected end of
period housing wealth
b
(0)
t+1   mph;t+1h(0)t , (2.1)
where m denotes the exogenous pledgeable fraction of housing, ph;t+1 the
end of period real price of housing, and h(0)t the households housing stock.
As we will see below, this constraint will become relevant for impatient
households, while it will be irrelevant for patient ones.
Both types of households derive utility from consumption c(0)t and hous-
ing h(0)t and disutility from labor n
(0)
t and maximize the innite sum of ex-
pected utility. Their objective is given by
1X
t=0
(0)tu(c(0)t ; h
(0)
t ; n
(0)
t ). (2.2)
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We consider the following CRRA-specication of the utility function
u(ct; ht; nt) =
c1 
c
t
1  c +
h1 
h
t
1  h  
n1+
n
t
1 + n
; (2.3)
where c(h) denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption (housing) and n the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.
Patient Households
The representative patient household generates income from working wtnt,
with wt being the real wage rate and the return of bond holdings b
g
t . Labor
income is taxed at the rate nt . Every period the household can adjust its
stock of housing according to ht   (1  h)ht 1 at the price of housing ph;t,
with h being the depreciation rate of housing. The value of the housing
stock owned by the household in period t, ph;tht, is taxed at the rate ht .
Thus, we consider a housing property tax, that is proportional to the value
of the current housing stock and is paid every period. The budget constraint
of the patient households is given by
ct + ph;t
h
1 + ht

ht   (1  h)ht 1
i
+
bgt+1
Rgt
+
bt+1
Rt
(2.4)
= (1  nt )wtnt + bgt + bt;
where ct denotes consumption,
bgt+1
Rgt
investment in new government bonds
with the relating gross interest rate Rgt = 1 + r
g
t and bt privately issued
debt with the gross interest rate Rt = 1 + rt. The patient household will
hold positive amounts of bgt > 0 and bt > 0 and hence be the lender in
equilibrium. Thats why the collateral constraint (2.1) will be irrelevant for
patient households: bt+1 > 0 >  mph;t+1ht.
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Impatient Households
The budget constraint of the representative impatient household analogously
reads
c0t + ph;t
h
1 +  0ht

h0t   (1  h)h0t 1
i
+
b0gt+1
Rgt
+
b0t+1
Rt
(2.5)
= (1  nt )wtn0t + b0gt + b0t.
Since we rule out short sales in government bonds, the impatient households
will set b0gt+1 = b
0g
t = 0. Furthermore, this type will be the private borrower in
equilibirium, i.e. b0t+1 =   s1 sbt+1 < 0, following from the market clearing
condition for private debt (1  s) b0t+1 + sbt+1 = 0. Hence, the collateral
constraint (2.1) will become relevant here. Therefore, there is a a limit on
the obligations of impatient households which is given by b0t+1   mph;t+1h0t.
2.2.2 Government
The government levies a at-rate tax on labor income nt and a housing
property tax  (0)ht and issues one-period bonds (b
(0)g
t  0 8t  0) to nance
an exogenous stream of government expenditures (gt):
gt  
bgt+1
Rgt
+ bgt = s
h
t ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t + nt wtnTt ; (2.6)
where nTt = snt+(1  s)n0t denotes total labor supply. As mentioned before,
the di¤erent housing tax rates ht and 
0h
t can be understood as taxing the
wealthier agents which will be the patient households in equilibrium at a
rate that di¤ers from (and will be higher than) the one for the wealth-poor
impatient households which will own smaller houses in equilibrium.
2.2.3 Firms
The production side of the economy is characterized by two sectors, one of
which produces consumption goods yc and the other housing yh. In both
sectors, there is a continuum of rms, which are assumed to produce with
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the same technology for simplicity. The representative rm of each sector
produces its output with labor according to
yc;t = n
T
c;t
yh;t = n
T
h;t;
where total labor input in both sectors sum up to total labor demand nT;Dt =
nTc;t+n
T
h;t, which meets total labor supply given by n
T;S
t = snt+(1  s)n0t in
equilibrium leading to snt+ (1  s)n0t = nTc;t+ nTh;t = nTt . Labor is assumed
to be totally mobile between the two sectors leading to a wage rate that is
the same for both sectors.
2.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
We now describe the competitive equilibrium of the private sector and then
set up the Ramsey problem.
Patient Households
A patient household chooses the values of ct, ht, nt, b
g
t+1 and bt+1 to max-
imize (2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.4) leading to the rst order
conditions
h 
h
t =

1 + ht

ph;tc
 c
t (2.7)
 c ct+1 (1  h) ph;t+1
n
n
t = (1  nt )wtc 
c
t (2.8)
c 
c
t = R
g
t c
 c
t+1 (2.9)
c 
c
t = Rtc
 c
t+1 : (2.10)
Equation (2.7) describes housing demand. In the optimum, the marginal
utility of current housing h 
h
t equals the marginal utility of foregone con-
sumption c 
c
t at the gross price of housing
 
1 + ht

ph;t less the discounted
marginal utility of next periods consumption c 
c
t+1 achieved from selling
the house after depreciation (1  h) at the price ph;t+1. Equation (2.8),
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that is fairly standard, describes labor supply of a patient household and
equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
n
n
t
c 
c
t
to the net real wage rate (1  nt )wt. Equations (2.9) and (2.10) are
Euler equations with respect to public and private lending.
Impatient Households
An impatient household chooses the values of c0t, h0t, n0t and b0t+1 to maximize
(2.2) subject to the budget constraint (2.5) and the collateral constraint (2.1)
leading to the rst order conditions
h0 
h
t =

1 + ht

ph;tc
0 c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1 (2.11)
+!tmph;t+1
n0
n
t = (1  nt )wtc0 
c
t (2.12)
!t =
c0 
c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 Rt
Rt
(2.13)
and the complementary slackness conditions
!t
 
b0t+1 +mph;t+1h
0
t

= 0; b0t+1 +mph;t+1h
0
t  0; !t  0:
Equation (2.11) describes housing demand of an impatient household. The
term !tmph;t+1 stems from the collateral constraint, with !t being the
multiplier on this constraint. Equation (2.12) is the labor supply func-
tion of an impatient household. Equation (2.13) is the modied Euler
equation resulting from the fact that the impatient household is borrow-
ing constrained. In the steady state, the collateral constraint will be bind-
ing as we can see from (2.10) which becomes 1R =  and (2.13) leading to
! = c0 c
 
1=R  0 = c0 c     0 > 0. Finally, from the complementary
slackness conditions we get b0 +mphh0 = 0, b0 =  mphh0.
Furthermore, the transversality conditions limt!1 tuct
 bgt+1
Rgt
= 0 and
limt!1 tuct
b0t+1
Rt
= 0 must hold, of which the latter is redundant due to the
collateral constraint that is more restrictive.
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Firms
In both sectors, the representative rm maximizes prots according to
max
nTc;t
c;t = max
nTc;t
 
nTc;t   wtnTc;t

in the nal consumption goods sector and
max
nTh;t
h;t = max
nTh;t
 
ph;tn
T
h;t   wtnTh;t

in the housing sector leading to the rst order conditions
wt = 1 and ph;t = 1.
Aggregate Resource Constraint
Finally, due to identical production technologies and perfect mobility of
labor between the two sectors, the aggregate resource constraint is given by
(see Appendix 2.5.1)
cTt + gt + ph;th
T
t = yc;t + ph;tyh;t + (1  h)ph;thTt 1: (2.14)
2.2.5 The Ramsey Problem
We assume that the government has access to a commitment technology
and is able to bind itself to its policy. The government chooses the values
of ht, ct, nt, h0t, c0t, n0t and the tax rates ht ;  0ht and nt in order to maximize
social welfare subject to the private sector equilibrium conditions, the re-
source and the implementability constraint summarized in Appendix 2.5.2,
while nancing an exogenous stream of government expenditures fgtg1t=0.
Following Monacelli (2008), in this economy with two types of agents, social
welfare is measured by the weighted sum of utility of the two types
1X
t=0
tsu(ct; ht; nt) + 
0t (1  s)u(c0t; h0t; n0t)
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and the aggregate discount rate is dened as e = s0(1 s) to be used as
discount rate for the constraints. For the mathematical formulation of the
Ramsey problem see Appendix 2.5.2, where also the rst-order conditions
of the Ramsey problem and the steady state are derived.
2.3 Results
This section presents and discusses optimal taxation results of the model.
First, as a natural starting point of the analysis, results for the representative
agent version, which can be derived analytically, will be given. The relation
of these results to existing literature on optimal taxation will be discussed.
Then, numerical results for the full version of the model will be given and
compared with the results of the representative agent version in order to
point out the role of the collateral constraint. Finally, we will compare
the role of the di¤erence in discount rates against the role of the collateral
constraint and present sensitivity analyses.
2.3.1 Representative Agent Version
By setting the discount rate of the impatient agents equal to the one of the
patient agents, 0 = , the model collapses to a representative agent version.
For this version, we can derive analytical solutions for the steady state tax
rates which are the labor income tax n and the housing property tax h.
The optimal steady state tax rate on labor income is given by (see Ap-
pendix 2.5.3)
n =
 (n + c)
1 +  (1 + n)
and is positive for  > 0. It only depends on the multiplier on the imple-
mentability constraint,   0, and the parameters c and n.
The optimal steady state tax rate on housing is given by (see Appendix
2.5.3)
h =

1  

h   1

| {z }
>0

h   c

| {z }
(i)
(1   (1  h))| {z }
(ii)
: (2.15)
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This equation reects two features of housing: (i) can be attributed
to the fact that housing delivers utility like consumption and (ii) to the
durability of housing. For  > 0, the sign of h, thus whether housing
should be taxed or subsidized, only depends on the term (i) in (2.15). The
term (ii) in (2.15) can be neglected for the sign of h, since 1    (1  h)| {z }
2(0;1)
is positive. Further, the analysis has to be restricted to values of h <
1
 + 1 implying 
 
h   1 < 1, which ensures that the second derivatives
are negative resulting in maxima (see Appendix 2.5.3). Thus, the rst term
in (2.15) is as well irrelevant for the sign of h.
Hence, whether housing should be taxed or subsidized only depends on
the inverses of the intertemporal elasticities of substitution c and h. From
principles of optimal taxation, we know that goods with lower elasticities
should be taxed at a higher rate. Since we do not consider a consumption
tax at all, which means a zero tax on consumption, whether housing should
be taxed or subsidized depends on whether its intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is lower or higher than the one of consumption. There are
three cases:
1. For c = h, housing and consumption should be treated identically
due to identical intertemporal elasticities of substitution, leading to
an optimal tax rate on housing of zero.
2. If the elasticity of housing is smaller than the one of consumption, i.e.
1
c >
1
h
, c < h, the optimal housing tax rate is positive.
3. For c > h, the optimal housing tax rate is negative since the elas-
ticity of consumption is smaller than the one of housing, 1c <
1
h
.
These results are compatible with the ones of Eerola and Määttänen
(2009) who consider a more general representative agent framework with
capital and optimal taxation of capital in addition to housing.
While the term (ii) in (2.15) is irrelevant for the sign of h, it has a
large e¤ect on the size of it. For the baseline calibration (see Table 2.1),
for instance, it reduces the housing tax by more than 97%. However, the
21
higher h is, i.e. the lower the durability of housing is, the smaller is the
impact of (ii) on the size of h. Notice, that (ii) disappears for the case
h = 1, where the durability of housing is assumed away and housing fully
depreciates within one period.
2.3.2 Results of the Full Version
Since analytical results are not available for the full version, we consider
numerical results for the steady state, where the collateral constraint is
binding, as we have seen before in Section 2.2.4. For comparison, we also
give numerical results for the representative agent version in the baseline
calibration.
Calibration
In this section, the baseline calibration of the model is described. Following
Iacoviello (2005), one time period is set to one quarter and the discount
factor of patient households to  = 0:99 leading to a steady state gross real
interest rate of R = 1:01, which is equivalent to an annual real interest rate
of 4%. The discount factor of impatient households is set to 0 = 0:95 by
Iacoviello (2005) as a compromise of the estimates given in the literature,
which is adopted here. However, in section 2.3.3, we will consider a variation
in 0 between 0:95 and 0:97 to see how this a¤ects the results. In order
to get a wage share of patient households equal to swnswn+(1 s)wn0 = 0:64
as in Iacoviello (2005), we set s = 0:62, while we will also show in the
sensitivity analyses 2.3.4 how a variation in population shares alters the
results. Furthermore, we set the pledgeable fraction of housing to m = 0:55
resulting from an estimation of Iacoviello (2005). Hence, an impatient agent
can only borrow up to 55% of the value of his house. We will also consider
in section 2.3.3, how a variation in m between 0 and 1, which covers all
relevant values for m, a¤ects the results. The depreciation rate of housing
is set following Davis and Heathcote (2005), who estimate an annual rate of
1:41%. According to this, we set h = 0:0035 for a quarter.
In the calibration of the utility parameters c and n we follow King
22
and Rebelo (1999), who say that the basic RBC model with log utility in
consumption implies a labor supply elasticity of 4. Hence, we set c = 1
and n = 1=4, while we will also conduct robustness checks for both of these
parameters in section 2.3.4.
Since the aim of the chapter is to evaluate optimal taxation of housing,
the utility parameter of housing h is calibrated in order to match an em-
pirical fact on housing. According to Iacoviello (2009), where some stylized
facts about housing, that should be matched when calibrating models of
housing, are listed, total housing stock is on average 1:5 times as large as
annual GDP in the US between 1952 and 2008. Therefore, we set the para-
meter h in order to match this value. Since in the model one time period
is one quarter and hence y in the notation of the model denotes quarterly
GDP, we have to multiply this value by four and to match the ratio of the
value of the total housing stock to quarterly GDP of h
T
y = 6 (since ph;t = 1).
This is achieved by setting h = 1:75 leading to an elasticity of 1
h
= 4=7.
Nevertheless, we will also give sensitivity results concerning the parameter
h in section 2.3.4.
For the calibration of governmental variables g and bg we use data from
the Worldbank.2 In 2010, US general government nal consumption expen-
ditures amounted to 17% of annual GDP. Since both, government expendi-
tures and GDP are ow variables, the ratio is the same for a time period of
one quarter, gy = 0:17. Moreover, US total central government debt made
up 76:8% of annual GDP in 2010. Since government debt is a stock variable,
this value again has to be multiplied by four. Hence, the ratio we have to
match in terms of quarterly GDP is given by b
g
y = 3. These values of the
governmental variables are achieved by setting g = 0:172 and bg = 3:1. The
baseline parameter calibration is summarized in Table 2.1.
Given this parameter calibration we compute the steady state numeri-
cally, which delivers the optimal values of consumption, housing, and labor
for both types of agents as well as the optimal tax rates h,  0h and n.
2Data from Worldbank web page: "Central Government Debt, Total" and "General
Government Final Consumption Expenditure" on http://data.worldbank.org/.
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Table 2.1: Baseline Parameter Calibration.
Description Source/Target Parameter Value
Discount factor patient households Iaco. 2005  0:99
Discount factor impatient households Iaco. 2005 0 0:95
Pledgeable fraction of housing Iaco. 2005 m 0:55
Depreciation rate of housing D&H 2005 h 0:0035
Share of the patient households wage share = 0:64 s 0:62
Inverse of Frisch elasticity K&R 1999 n 1=4
Inverse of IES in consumption K&R 1999 c 1
Inverse of IES in housing hT =y = 6 h 1:75
Government expenditures g=y = 0:17 g 0:172
Government debt bg=y = 3 bg 3:1
Numerical Results
The results of the full and the representative agent version for the base-
line calibration are summarized in Table 2.2. Notice, that the optimal tax
rate on housing in the representative agent version is close to zero but still
positive (h = 0:2%), while for the full version, we get two housing tax
rates that di¤er both markedly from zero. The optimal housing tax rate
for patient households is h = 1:65% and the one for impatient households
 0h =  2:72%. Thus, for the baseline calibration, it is optimal to subsidize
housing of impatient and hence constrained households and to tax patient
ones in the full version, while in the representative agent version housing
is taxed at a positive rate close to zero. Hence, the subsidy for impatient
households results from the heterogeneity in patience rates and the collateral
constraint, that are absent in the representative agent version.
To see how this subsidy optimally is nanced, we consider the govern-
ment budget (2.6) in the steady state
g + (1  ) bg = nnT + shh+ (1  s)  0hh0: (2.16)
Expenditures are given by g + (1  ) bg = 0:203 and revenues by nnT +
shh + (1  s)  0hh0 = 0:1887 + 0:0668   0:0526 = 0:203. We see, that
the labor income tax nances government expenditures, while the housing
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subsidy for impatient households is nanced for the most part by a housing
tax on the patient households. Therefore, the housing tax rate on the patient
households is much larger than the tax rate on housing in the representative
agent version. This point becomes clearer, when we consider the case g =
bg = 0 (last column of Table 2.2). For this case, the left hand side of
the government budget (2.16) is zero, g + (1  ) bg = 0, and we observe
a large decline in the labor income tax rate. On the right hand side of
(2.16), we have revenues from taxing labor income equal to nnT = 0:029,
revenues from taxing housing of patient households given by shh = 0:069
and housing subsidies for impatient households equal (1  s)  0hh0 =  0:098.
We see that the largest part, more than 70%, of housing subsidies, is nanced
by taxing housing of patient households. Hence, this can be interpreted
as a redistribution from wealth-rich, i.e. patient households with a higher
housing stock (h = 6:5), to wealth-poor households with a lower housing
stock (h0 = 5:1).
To link these results to the empirical ndings described in the intro-
duction, we compute the ratio of total housing subsidies to GDP given by
 (1 s) 0hh0
swn+(1 s)wn0 . For the baseline calibration, we get a ratio of 5:24%. Hence,
according to the model the granted subsidies in the US that added up to
1:5% of GDP in 2011 seem to be lower than what would be optimal. On
the other hand, the model is likely to overestimate housing subsidies since
it does not incorporate physical capital. Housing is the only component of
wealth in the model, while in the US it accounts for half of total household
wealth (see e.g. Iacoviello, 2009).
2.3.3 Discounting vs. Collateral Constraint
The result of subsidizing impatient agentshousing is due to two features
of the model, as we have seen in the previous section, the di¤erent discount
rates of the two types and the collateral constraint, while the former is nec-
essary for the latter. Without di¤erent discount rates, the model collapses
to the representative agent version where private borrowing and hence the
collateral constraint are irrelevant.
The aim of this section is to analyze how these two features a¤ect housing
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Table 2.2: Numerical Results - Comparison.
Version Repr. Agent Full Version
Calibration Baseline Baseline g = bg = 0
c 0:8161 0:7999 0:9485
h 9:6310 6:5323 7:4249
n 1:0218 1:0630 1:0954
c0   0:8316 1:0136
h0   5:0929 6:6759
n0   0:9100 0:8398
n 0:1795 0:1878 0:0296
h 0:0020 0:0165 0:0149
 0h    0:0272  0:0388
subsidies. Therefore, we rst dene the two e¤ects related to these two
features. Housing subsidies stemming from the collateral constraint that
are granted by the Ramsey planner in order to soften the constraint and
hence originate from the market friction are attributed to the collateral
e¤ect, whereas housing subsidies that purely stem from the di¤erence in
discounting and hence are based on preferences are attributed to the discount
rate e¤ect. To identify how housing subsidies are a¤ected by these two
e¤ects, we conduct the following experiment. First, we consider a variation
in the pledgeable fraction of housing, m, reaching from 0 to 1 and illustrate
in Figure 2.1 how this a¤ects the housing tax rates h and  0h, private debt
given by (1  s)mh0, the di¤erence in housing stocks of the two agents, h h0
, the tightness of the collateral constraint measured by ! = c0 c
 
   0
(see (2.13)) and redistribution measured by the ratio of revenues from taxing
housing of the patient agents to the subsidies that impatient agents receive:
Red =   shh
(1 s)h0 0h . The plots are given for the benchmark calibration but
with equal population shares, s = 0:5, for convenience in aggregation. Then,
we do the same for a variation in the borrowers discount rate between
0 = 0:95 and 00:97.
First, consider the lower limit, m = 0, where private borrowing is zero
and hence the collateral e¤ect is shut down (see Iacoviello (2005) for a similar
experiment). Since the link between borrowing and housing of the impatient
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Figure 2.1: E¤ects of varying the pledgeable fraction of housing m for the
baseline calibration with s = 0:5.
household is cut o¤, in this case, the resulting level of subsidies is only due
the discount rate e¤ect. Then, the variation in m between the lower and
the upper limit, m = 1, where housing is fully pledgeable, illustrates the
role of the collateral e¤ect compared to the discount rate e¤ect for a given
0 = 0:95. Figure 2.1 shows that a higher pledgeable fraction of housing leads
to a larger amount of private debt (panel 2) and hence to a tighter collateral
constraint (due to lower consumption) (panel 3) resulting in a higher level
of housing subsidies for the constrained households (panel 1, dashed line),
whereas the tax rate on the patient agents does not change much (panel 1,
solid line). This is due to the fact that the collateral constraint and hence
the parameter m is not directly relevant for the patient agents. Thus, the
level of redistribution (panel 4), as it is measured here, decreases in m since
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Figure 2.2: E¤ects of varying the impatient agentsdiscount rate 0 for the
baseline calibration with s = 0:5.
housing subsidies to impatient agents rise faster than housing tax revenues
from patient ones do.
For m = 0, where the collateral channel is shut down, the resulting
subsidy is  0h =  1:04%, whereas for the baseline case of m = 0:55 it more
than doubles to  0h =  2:24%. This makes clear that housing subsidies
not only result from a di¤erence in preference parameters but are also due
to the market friction, the collateral constraint. Regarding the rates just
mentioned and taking into account that the discount rate channel dampens
the e¤ect of the collateral channel, which is discussed below, more than half
of the resulting subsidies can be attributed to the collateral constraint in
the baseline calibration.
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Figure 2.2 plots the results for a variation in 0. Notice that 0 de-
creases, i.e. the di¤erence in discount rates increases from left to right on
the abscissa. The higher this di¤erence is, the larger is the housing subsidy
for impatient agents  0h (panel 1, dashed line) and the housing tax for pa-
tient agents h (panel 1, solid line). In contrast to the variation in m, the
variation in 0 a¤ects both rates equally. As for a higher m, the level of
redistribution (panel 4) decreases in the di¤erence in discount rates for the
same reason. In contrast, unlike a higher m leading to higher borrowing, a
larger discount rate di¤erence lowers borrowing since it reduces housing of
the impatient agents. Hence, we can conclude that the discount rate e¤ect
dampens the collateral e¤ect since it reduces private borrowing. Here, the
collateral constraint becomes tighter due to the larger di¤erence in discount
rates (! = c0 c
 
   0).
2.3.4 Sensitivity Analyses
In the previous section, we have seen that the main result of optimality of
housing subsidies to impatient agents is robust to variations in the para-
meters m and 0. In this section, we will check whether it is also robust to
changes in the parameters c, h and s. Two interesting questions come here
in mind. The rst question is, what happens if the intertemporal elasticities
are changed such that h < c. Since we have seen that this changed the
sign of the housing tax in the representative agent version, it is interesting
to see how this change will a¤ect optimal taxation in the full version. An-
other question we will explore is how changing the share of lenders s a¤ects
the results. We will consider the case where both types have equal shares
s = 0:5. Table 2.3 summarizes the results.
First of all, we can conclude from Table 2.3, that for every parameter
variation we consider, it remains optimal to subsidize housing of impatient
households and to tax housing of patient ones.
In the third column where we lower h, housing demand rises and both
types have higher housing stocks (h
T
y  8:2) compared to the baseline cali-
bration in column 2 of Table 2.3. Although h is lower, tax revenues from
taxing housing of patient agents are higher due to their higher housing stock
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Table 2.3: Numerical Results - Robustness.
Baseline Calibration, except
  h = 1:5 c = 2 s = 0:5
c 0:7999 0:7933 0:8713 0:7950
h 6:5323 9:2023 6:8915 5:9908
n 1:0630 1:0965 1:1581 1:0595
c0 0:8316 0:8396 0:8945 0:8198
h0 5:0929 6:8126 5:6412 4:7861
n0 0:9100 0:8739 0:9383 0:9370
n 0:1878 0:1882 0:2124 0:1935
h 0:0165 0:0150 0:0124 0:0212
 0h  0:0272  0:0281  0:0366  0:0224
h = 9:2. Therefore, subsidies for impatient households can increase slightly.
In column 4, we set c = 2 > h = 1:75. We see that, in contrast to the
representative agent version, there is no important change in the tax rates.
Moreover,  0h becomes larger while h decreases, since households attach a
higher value to housing compared to consumption. As a result, both types
work more to own a larger house, while the labor income tax increases.
In column 5 the share of lenders in the economy is lower than in the
baseline calibration. This means that there are less wealth-rich households
in the economy who nance the housing subsidy. Therefore, the tax rates
n and h are higher while the subsidy  0h is lower. As a result, both types
of households have lower consumption and housing levels.
Summing up, in every variation we considered, m, 0, h and s, the
main result of the chapter holds. It is optimal to disburden the impatient
and hence constrained households by subsidizing their housing.
2.4 Conclusion
Housing subsidies that can be observed in many industrialized countries
have been subject to macroeconomic research since many years. Neverthe-
less, there is no denite conclusion one can draw from this research. While
the opponents point at ine¢ ciencies resulting from housing subsidies due
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to distortions in investment decisions of agents, the proponents argue that
subsidies internalize externalities accompanied with homeownership.
This chapter, in which we have studied optimal taxation of housing in
a borrower-lender framework resulting from di¤erent discount rates with
housing being used as collateral for private loans, provides results in favor
of housing subsidies. The main result of this chapter is that optimal scal
policy should disburden impatient borrowers by subsidizing their housing
in the presence of collateral constraints. We nd that this subsidy has
to be nanced to the largest extent by a housing tax on the patient and
unconstrained households and to a smaller part by a labor income tax.
Hence, a redistribution from patient/unconstrained households to impa-
tient/constrained ones takes place.
In this framework housing subsidies result from two features of the model,
the di¤erent discount rates of the two types of agents and the collateral
constraint. We have seen that for the baseline calibration more than half of
the subsidy can be attributed to the collateral constraint. Hence, housing
subsidies not only result from the di¤erence in preference parameters but
rather are due to the market friction in our model. Moreover, the sensitivity
analyses showed that the main result of housing subsidies for constrained
households is robust to several parameter variations.
Furthermore, we considered a representative agent version of the model,
which delivers intuitive results in line with the principles of optimal taxation
that goods with lower elasticities should be taxed at a higher rate. In our
benchmark calibration, this turns out to be housing. Hence, the housing tax
rate is positive in the representative agent version, while it is negative for
constrained households in the full version.
This chapter provides a rationale for housing subsidies other than exter-
nalities that have been focused on in previous studies and indicates a new
path for further research. An extension of the model could be the addition
of inter-generational heterogeneity in an overlapping generations model as in
Gervais (2002). The life cycle behavior of agents could also have substantial
implications and should also be accounted for when trying to measure the
e¤ects of housing subsidies on social welfare. This is left for future research.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Aggregate Resource Constraint
Consolidation of the budget constraints (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) delivers
sct + (1  s) c0t + sph;t
h
1 + ht

ht   (1  h)ht 1
i
+(1  s) ph;t
h
1 +  0ht

h0t   (1  h)h0t 1
i
+ gt
= s (1  nt )wtnt + (1  s) (1  nt )wtn0t
+sht ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t;
since the terms bt, b0t and b
g
t cancel out. With x
T
t = sxt + (1  s)x0t for
aggregate variables this becomes to
cTt + ph;t
h
1 + ht

hTt   (1  h)hTt 1
i
+ gt
= (1  nt )wtnTt + ht ph;thTt ;
which can further be simplied to
cTt + ph;th
T
t + gt
= wtn
T
t + ph;t(1  h)hTt 1:
Inserting the production functions, we get (2.14).
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2.5.2 Solution of the Full Version
Summary of Private Sector Equilibrium Conditions
Summarizing the private sector equilibrium conditions delivers
h 
h
t =

1 + ht

ph;tc
 c
t   c 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1
n
n
t = (1  nt )wtc 
c
t
c 
c
t = Rtc
 c
t+1
c 
c
t = R
g
t c
 c
t+1
h0 
h
t =

1 +  0ht

ph;tc
0 c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1 + !tmph;t+1
n0
n
t = (1  nt )wtc0 
c
t
!t =
c0 
c
t   0c0 
c
t+1 Rt
Rt
c0t +

1 +  0ht

ph;th
0
t = (1  nt )wtn0t + (1  h)ph;th0t 1  
b0t+1
Rt
+ b0t
0 =
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!h
gt   sht ph;tht   (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t   nt wtnTt
i
+ bg0
yc;t = n
T
c;t, yh;t = n
T
h;t, wt = 1, ph;t = 1
hTt = sht + (1  s)h0t, nTt = snt + (1  s)n0t, cTt = sct + (1  s) c0t
nTt = n
T
c;t + n
T
h;t, b
0
t+1   mph;t+1h0t,
cTt + gt + ph;th
T
t = yc;t + ph;tyh;t + (1  h)ph;thTt 1:
Eliminating prices and using 
tc 
c
t
c 
c
0
=
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1 the conditions above
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can be reduced to
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c
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c
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c
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 0ht h0t   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sct + (1  s) c0t + gt + sht + (1  s)h0t
= snt + (1  s)n0t + (1  h)
 
sht 1 + (1  s)h0t 1

given bg0 > 0 and b0 > 0.
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The Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem reads
J =
1X
t=0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
tsu(ct; ht; nt) + 
0t (1  s)u(c0t; h0t; n0t)
+ett;1 hh ht    1 + ht  c ct +  (1  h) c ct+1 i
+ett;2 hnnt cct   1 + 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c 
c
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t7b
g
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9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
where t;i denotes the Lagrange multiplier on constraint i in period t, while
the multiplier 7 on the intertemporal government budget constraint, which
is derived below, has no time index since it is an intertemporal constraint.
The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem are as well derived below,
where also the steady state of the problem is given.
Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint
The intertemporal government budget constraint is derived as follows. We
write the government budget (2.6) for t+ 1 and solve for
bgt+1 = s
h
t+1ph;t+1ht+1+(1  s)  0ht+1ph;t+1h0t+1+nt+1wt+1nTt+1 gt+1+
bgt+2
Rgt+1
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and insert this in the one for t
gt   1
Rgt
24 sht+1ph;t+1ht+1 + (1  s)  0ht+1ph;t+1h0t+1
+nt+1wt+1n
T
t+1   gt+1 +
bgt+2
Rgt+1
35+ bgt
= sht ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t + nt wtnTt :
This can be rewritten as
gt +
gt+1
Rgt
  b
g
t+2
RgtR
g
t+1
+ bgt = s
h
t ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t
+
sht+1ph;t+1ht+1 + (1  s)  0ht+1ph;t+1h0t+1
Rgt
+ nt wtn
T
t +
nt+1wt+1n
T
t+1
Rgt
:
Iterating on this we get with the transversality condition on government
debt the intertemporal government budget constraint
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
gt + b
g
0
=
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
sht ph;tht + (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t +
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!
nt wtn
T
t
,
1X
t=0
 
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
!h
gt   sht ph;tht   (1  s)  0ht ph;th0t   nt wtnTt
i
+ bg0 = 0:
Inserting (2.44) delivers the form used in the formulation of the Ramsey
problem.
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First Order Conditions and Steady State
The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem can be summarized by:
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with bt = tet =  s0(1 s)t =

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0
s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=h
0

sit
:
Assuming that we are initially in the steady state (c0 = c for t = 0),
where variables without subscript denote steady state values henceforth,
these conditions read in the steady state
1c
 c + 7sh = 0 (2.17)
2 + 3   5n0   7nT = 0 (2.18)
4c
0 c + 5h0 + 7 (1  s)h0 = 0 (2.19)
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h   b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   + 5mh0cc    b  6 scc+1
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 7cc
h
g   shh  (1  s)  0hh0   nnT
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1  1
h
sh

+ 6
he(1  h)  1i  7h = 0 (2.22)
 nn + 2
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+ 6   7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(1  h)  1i  7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 n0n + 3
n (1  n)
(1  s)n0 + 5
(1  n)
(1  s) + 6   7
n = 0:(2.26)
The private sector equilibrium conditions that determine the steady state
together with the rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem (2.17)-(2.26)
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are given by
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 0h
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g + (1  ) bg = shh+ (1  s)  0hh0 + n  sn+ (1  s)n0(2.32)
sc+ (1  s) c0 + g = sn+ (1  s)n0   hsh  h (1  s)h0: (2.33)
2.5.3 Representative Agent Version
Solution
The rst order conditions of the representative household are given by (with
uxt =
@u
@xt
)
uht + u
c
t+1 (1  h) ph;t+1 = uct

1 + ht

ph;t (2.34)
unt =  uctwt (1  nt ) (2.35)
uct = u
c
t+1R
g
t (2.36)
and the transversality condition on bonds holds limt!1 tuct
bgt+1
Rgt
= 0: Insert-
ing (2.36) in (2.34) delivers the relationship between the marginal utilities
of housing and consumption
uht
uct
=

1 + ht

ph;t   (1  h)
Rgt
ph;t+1: (2.37)
The rst order conditions of the rms lead to the real wage rate wt =
1and the price of housing ph;t = 1 and the aggregate resource constraint
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ct + gt + ht   (1  h)ht 1 = nt (2.38)
The Ramsey problem is to maximize social welfare subject to the aggre-
gate resource constraint (2.38) and the implementability constraint (2.46),
which is derived below, and can be written as
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Insertion of the marginal utilities leads to
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The rst order conditions of the Ramsey problem are given by
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Equating (2.39) and (2.40) we get the optimal labor income tax
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The rst order condition with respect to housing is given by
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 (1  c) (1  h) :
Hence, the optimal tax rate on housing can be written as
ht =  (1  c)  

1  h
 h ht
c 
c
t
   (1  
c) (1  h)
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with h
 h
t
c 
c
t
=
 
1 + ht
   (1 h)
Rgt
following from (2.43). In the steady state
with Rgt = 
 1 the optimal housing tax rate is given by
h =

 
h   c
1   (h   1) (1   (1  h)) : (2.42)
Second Derivatives
The second derivatives with respect to consumption, labor, and housing are
given by
@2J
@c2t
=  cc 1 ct| {z }
>0
[1   (c   1)]
@2J
@n2t
=  nn 1+nt| {z }
>0
[1 +  (n + 1)]
@2J
@h2t
=  hh 1 ht| {z }
>0
h
1  

h   1
i
:
The second derivative with respect to labor is always negative, the ones for
consumption and housing for c < 1+1 and 
h < 1+1, which is the case in
our calibrations since  is typically small. This ensures that we get maxima.
Further, this implies 
 
h   1 < 1.
Derivation of the Implementability Constraint
The implementability constraint is derived as follows. We write (2.37) in
the form
Rgt =
(1  h)ph;t+1 
1 + ht

ph;t   u
h
t
uct
(2.43)
and rewrite condition (2.36) uct = u
c
t 1
 
Rgt 1
 1 and insert uct 1 =
uct 2
 
Rgt 2
 1 ) uct = uct 2 2  Rgt 1 1  Rgt 2 1. Iterating on this we
get
tuct = u
c
0
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1
: (2.44)
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Thus, we can rewrite the transversality condition as (with uc0 > 0)
lim
t!1
t 1Y
i=0
(Rgi )
 1 b
g
t+1
Rgt
= 0:
Now, we solve the household budget constraint for period t+ 1 for bgt+1
bgt+1 = ct+1 +

1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1 +
bgt+2
Rgt+1
   1  nt+1wt+1nt+1   (1  h)ph;t+1ht
and insert this in the one for period t to get
ct +

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
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+
1
Rgt
24 ct+1 +  1 + ht+1 ph;t+1ht+1 + bgt+2Rgt+1
   1  nt+1wt+1nt+1   (1  h)ph;t+1ht
35  bgt
= (1  nt )wtnt + (1  h)ph;tht 1.
This can be rewritten as
ct +
ct+1
Rgt
+

1 + ht

ph;tht   (1  h)ph;t+1ht
Rgt
+
 
1 + ht+1

ph;t+1ht+1
Rgt
+
bgt+2
RgtR
g
t+1
= (1  nt )wtnt +
 
1  nt+1

wt+1nt+1
Rgt
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We now collect the terms with ht, factor out ht and insert (2.43)
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
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: (2.45)
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Thus, we can rewrite the budget constraint again to get
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Inserting the budget constraint of t+ 2 then delivers
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We can rewrite this as
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Repeating the steps above in (2.45) we get
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Iterating on this and using the transversality conditions, we get the in-
tertemporal budget constraint with the initial endowments of h 1 and b
g
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By eliminating prices with (2.44) and (2.35) we get the implementability
constraint
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Chapter 3
Macroeconomic E¤ects of
the Federal Reserves MBS
Purchases
Coauthor: Andreas Schabert
3.1 Introduction
After hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates in the aftermath of the
nancial crisis, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) made use of several unconven-
tional policy measures. Large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs, also
known as quantitative easing (QE), were one of these measures. Within
these programs the Fed not only purchased treasuries (as done by the Bank
of Japan before, and the Bank of England and the European Central Bank
after the Fed), but also mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which even made
up the larger part of the purchased assets in the rst round of quantitative
easing (QE1).
In November 2008, when QE1 started, the Fed announced that it would
purchase MBS worth up to $500 billion issued by the government-sponsored
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fed chairman Bernanke argued
in 2008, that "housing and housing nance played a central role in pre-
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cipitating the current crisis" and concluded that "steps that stabilize the
housing market will help stabilize the economy as well" (Bernanke, 2008).
On March 18, 2009 the Fed decided to expand the program and to purchase
"up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities" in
order to "provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets"
(FOMC, 2009), such that the announced total purchases added up to $1250
billion in QE1. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, actual purchases during QE1 did
not fully reach the announced amount but summed up to $1120 billion. Fi-
nally, in 2012, the Fed decided to purchase agency MBS (as part of the QE3
program) at the amount of $40 billion each month. In his press conference
on September 13, 2012, Bernanke explained how the program was intended
to work: "The program of MBS purchases should increase the downward
pressure on long-term interest rates more generally, but also on mortgage
rates specically, which should provide further support to the housing sec-
tor by encouraging home purchases and renancing" (Bernanke, 2012). As
shown in Figure 3.1, total MBS purchases during QE3 added up to $900
billion. Compared to QE1, the QE3 program was not only smaller in total
size but also, the purchases in each quarter were smaller due to the longer
duration of the program.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis that quanties the
e¤ects of MBS purchases in the Feds QE programs on macroeconomic vari-
ables. While there is some empirical research on how these purchases inu-
enced MBS yields and mortgage rates (e.g. Hancock and Passmore 2011,
2012, 2015), we aim at measuring their e¤ects on real activity and aggre-
gate goods prices in a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices
and nancial frictions. In particular, we try to provide an assessment on
how macroeconomic aggregates, i.e. GDP, consumption and employment,
reacted to MBS purchases in a macroeconomic framework that is calibrated
to match Hancock and Passmores (2011, 2015) estimates for the e¤ects on
MBS yields.
The analysis is conducted in a framework that consists of two types of
households, patient and impatient ones, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
While patient households hold deposits at nancial intermediaries, the latter
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Figure 3.1: MBS Purchases in % of GDP, Annual Federal Funds Rate, and
Annual 30-Year Fixed Mortgage Rate, 2005Q4-2015Q2. Source: FRED.
grant loans to impatient households, which are collateralized by their hous-
ing, as in Iacoviello (2005). Banks face costs increasing in the amount of
loans they supply and decreasing in the amount of reserves, similar to Cur-
dia and Woodford (2011). To allow for non-neutrality of asset purchases,
we follow Schabert (2015) and assume that the central bank rations supply
of reserves and supplies money only in exchange for eligible assets.1 The
central bank can then inuence the yield of an eligible asset (like treasury
bills or MBS) when it purchases it with high powered money at an above-
market price. Regarding impatient borrowers MBS purchases imply a pos-
itive wealth e¤ect since they reduce MBS yields and increase house prices
as well as ination. This alleviates the borrowing constraint of impatient
households, who increase their consumption and housing. The e¤ectiveness
of the program in stimulating consumption, employment and GDP lies in
1Applying a much more stylized model (in particular, without nancial market fric-
tions), Schabert (2015) shows that a central bank can increase welfare by money rationing
and purchasing eligible assets in a state contingent way.
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the fact that it a¤ects those households that have a high marginal propensity
to consume out of wealth.
The model is calibrated applying US data from 1990Q1 to 2008Q3, such
that e¤ects from the nancial crisis are not taken into account. During this
period, the Fed supplied money essentially according to a "treasury only"
regime. With the announcement of QE1 also MBS became eligible. Since
the federal funds rate was e¤ectively zero during the period of the purchase
programs (see Figure 3.1), the analyses are conducted at the zero lower
bound. We specify the banking cost function in a parsimonious way with
two parameters, a level parameter and an elasticity of banking costs with
regard to loans/reserves. The level parameter is calibrated to match average
MBS yields between 1990Q1 and 2008Q3 and the elasticity parameter to
match empirical evidence on yield e¤ects of MBS purchases reported by
Hancock and Passmore (2011, 2015). Based on this calibration we aim at
quantifying the (untargeted) e¤ects of the purchases in QE1 and later in QE3
on output, consumption and employment as well as ination. Specically,
our results indicate that during QE1 GDP and consumption increased by
0.63%, and total hours worked by 0.95% in the announcement period. In the
subsequent period, where purchases started and the program was extended,
the reactions became larger and reached their maximum. In this period,
the increase in GDP was 1.12%, in total consumption 1.13%, in total hours
worked 1.67%, and in ination 0.45%. The cumulative e¤ects, which are
computed for the period of a binding zero lower bound, which covers 9
quarters for our QE1 simulation, indicate that in total MBS purchases in
QE1 increased GDP by 2.24%, total consumption by 2.36%, and total hours
worked by 3.36%. In comparison, the e¤ects during QE3 were largest in the
announcement period, in which GDP increased by 0.86%, total consumption
by 0.85%, total hours by 1.28%, and ination by 0.45%. As cumulative
e¤ects, we get an increase in GDP by 1.62%, in total consumption by 1.69%,
and in total hours worked by 2.43%. These smaller values for QE3 are due
to the fact that the program in QE3 was about 30% smaller in total size
and the purchases had a di¤erent schedule.
Besides the aforementioned empirical literature, there is, to the best of
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our knowledge, only one paper by Dai, Dufourt, and Zhang (2013) that
analyzes MBS purchases in a theoretical framework. They nd that MBS
purchases are useful in stabilizing the housing market but less e¤ective in
stabilizing GDP and employment, depending on the degree of segmentation
of credit branches (corporate vs. mortgage loans).2 While we try to assess
the e¤ects of MBS purchases in isolation, there is a growing literature that
studies the e¤ects of LSAP programs in general with purchases of treasuries,
corporate bonds and/or MBS, like e.g. Chen et al. (2012), Curdia and
Woodford (2011), Del Negro et al. (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011, 2013),
and Hörmann and Schabert (2015).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the model
with a household sector consisting two types of agents, a banking sector, a
rm sector with monopolistic competition and the public sector consisting
of the treasury and the central bank is described. In Section 3.3, the model
is calibrated, MBS purchases during QE1 and QE3 are described in detail
and their e¤ects are analyzed. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we present the model. We follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and consider two types of agents, patient and impatient ones. The for-
mer will save and the latter borrow in equilibrium. Intermediation between
these two types is conducted by nancial intermediaries which collect de-
posits from savers and grant loans to borrowing households. We assume that
debt contracts are not enforceable and are collateralized by housing (see Ia-
coviello, 2005). Mortgage loans are assumed to be tradable and will be
equivalent to mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The treasury issues one-
period bonds, which are held by nancial intermediaries and the central
bank. Following Schabert (2015), we assume that the central bank supplies
2They conclude that this is due to the small share of residential investment in GDP
and the absence of spillovers of MBS purchases on other credit markets. However, the
connection of housing to the real economy that is more important seems to be its usage
as collateral for private loans, which is why a reduction of MBS yields and mortgage rates
should have macroeconomic e¤ects, even if other yields are not a¤ected by MBS purchases.
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money only against eligible assets, here, treasuries and MBS. The central
bank sets the policy rate and can further control the amount of money sup-
plied against eligible assets, e.g. it can increase the supply of reserves by
purchasing MBS. For the simulation of the nancial crisis we will use a bank-
ing cost shock as in Christo¤el and Schabert (2015) and to make the zero
lower bound binding a shock to the discount factor of patient households, as
in Christiano et al. (2011). Henceforth, upper-case letters denote nominal
variables, while lower-case letters denote real variables.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of mass 1 consisting of two types, patient
ones, which are indexed with p and have a share of 0 < s < 1 of total
population, and impatient ones (indexed with i and share (1   s)). They
only di¤er with regard to their subjective discount factors: 1 > p > i > 0.
Both types of households derive utility from consumption c;t, housing h;t
and disutility from labor n;t ( = i; p) and maximize the innite sum of
expected utility. Their objective is given by
E0
1X
t=0
tu(c;t; h;t; n;t) (3.1)
where  = zt 
p is the discount factor for patient and  = i for impatient
households with 1 > zt 
p > i > 0. We consider a shock zt on the
discount factor of patient agents with log zt =  log z

t 1 + "

t , where "

t 
n:i:d:

0; 2

and 0 <  < 1 that is capable of making the zero lower
bound binding, as e.g. in Christiano et al. (2011). We use the following
CRRA-specication of the utility function
u(c;t; h;t; n;t) =
c1 
c
;t
1  c + 
h
h1 
h
;t
1  h   
n
n1+
n
;t
1 + n
. (3.2)
We rst describe the problem of a representative patient household and then
the one of a representative impatient household.
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Patient Households A patient household p enters a period t with de-
posits Dp;t 1 held at nancial intermediaries and real housing hp;t 1. Ne-
glecting borrowing from nancial intermediaries (which would never occur
in equilibrium), its budget constraint is given by
Ptcp;t+Ptph;t(hp;t  hp;t 1) +Dp;t=RDt = Dp;t 1+Ptwtnp;t+Ptp;t+Ptp;t;
(3.3)
where the left hand side contains expenditures for consumption, Ptcp;t, with
Pt denoting the aggregate price level, and housing, Ptph;thp;t, with the real
house price ph;t, and new holdings of deposits Dp;t at the price 1=RDt , while
the right hand side shows deposits from the preceding period as well as labor
income, Ptwtnp;t, transfers from the public sector, Ptp;t, and prots of rms
and retailers Ptp;t due to the assumption that patient households are the
owners of rms and retailers. A patient household chooses the values of
cp;t, hp;t, np;t and dp;t = Dp;t=Pt to maximize (3.1) subject to the budget
constraint (3.3) and a non-negativity constraint Dp;t  0, leading to the rst
order conditions
hh 
h
p;t = ph;tc
 c
p;t   zt pEtc 
c
p;t+1ph;t+1; (3.4)
nn
n
p;t = wtc
 c
p;t ; (3.5)
1
RDt
= zt 
pEt
c 
c
p;t+1
c 
c
p;t t+1
. (3.6)
Equation (3.4) describes housing demand of a patient household. In the
optimum, marginal utility of current housing hh 
h
p;t equals marginal util-
ity of foregone consumption c 
c
p;t at the price of housing ph;t less the dis-
counted marginal utility of next periods expected consumption zt 
pEtc
 c
p;t+1
achieved from selling the house at the expected price Etph;t+1. Equation
(3.5) describes labor supply of a patient household and (3.6) is the Euler
equation for deposits. Further, the transversality conditions hold.
Impatient Households Since an impatient household values current con-
sumption more than a patient one, it will become borrower in equilibrium.
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We assume that its debt is non-enforceable and is collateralized by housing.
A household i can borrow from intermediaries in nominal terms an amount
BMi;t =R
L
t < 0 in period t and pays back B
M
i;t in period t+1, where R
L
t is the
gross nominal interest rate on these loans. We follow Iacoviello (2005) and
assume that borrowing is limited by a (fraction) of the expected value of
housing at the beginning of the subsequent period when the loan matures
BMi;t   EtPt+1ph;t+1hi;t, (3.7)
where  denotes the (exogenous) pledgeable fraction of housing. An impa-
tient household i enters a period t with a mortgage loan BMi;t 1 < 0 and real
housing hi;t 1. It has expenditures for consumption, Ptci;t, and housing,
Ptph;thi;t, gets transfers, Pt i;t, earns labor income Ptwtni;t, and borrows by
issuing mortgage loans BMi;t =R
L
t . Neglecting deposits held at nancial inter-
mediaries (which would never occur in equilibrium), the budget constraint
of an impatient household i reads
Ptci;t + Ptph;t [hi;t   hi;t 1] +BMi;t =RLt = BMi;t 1 + Ptwtni;t + Pt i;t. (3.8)
An impatient household i chooses the values of ci;t, hi;t, ni;t, and bMi;t =
BMi;t =Pt to maximize (3.1) subject to the collateral constraint (3.7) and the
budget constraint (3.8) leading to the rst order conditions
hh 
h
i;t = c
 c
i;t ph;t   iEtc 
c
i;t+1ph;t+1   !tEtt+1ph;t+1; (3.9)
nn
n
i;t = wtc
 c
i;t ; (3.10)
c 
c
i;t
RLt
= iEt
c 
c
i;t+1
t+1
+ !t; (3.11)
with !t being the multiplier on the collateral constraint (3.7) and the com-
plementary slackness conditions !t(bMi;t + Ett+1ph;t+1hi;t) = 0;
bMi;t+Ett+1ph;t+1hi;t  0; and !t  0. Equation (3.9) describes housing de-
mand of an impatient household. Here, the additional term !tEtt+1ph;t+1,
which is subtracted on the right hand side and hence increases housing de-
mand of a borrower, stems from the fact that housing has an additional
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value as collateral for loans for impatient agents that is absent for patient
savers. Equation (3.10) describes the labor supply decision of an impa-
tient household and (3.11) is a modied Euler equation for mortgage debt
taking into account the collateral constraint (3.7). In equilibrium, the con-
dition for a binding borrowing constraint in the steady state, is given by
! = c 
c
i

1
RL
  i

. Hence, ! is larger zero, i.e. the borrowing constraint
is binding, if 1
RL
> 
i
 , which we can be ensured by setting 
i to a su¢ ciently
low value. Furthermore, the transversality conditions must hold.
3.2.2 Financial Intermediaries
There is a continuum of identical perfectly competitive nancial interme-
diaries (banks) of mass 1 indexed with b. Banks face costs of managing
loans, for which we consider an ad-hoc cost function t, following Curdia
and Woodford (2011). Bank bs budget constraint is given by
Pt
B
b;t +Db;t 1 +Bb;t=R
G
t +B
M
b;t=R
L
t +M
H
b;t + Ib;t (R
m
t   1)(3.12)
+ Ptt
 
BMb;t ; Qb;t

=
Db;t
RDt
+Bb;t 1 +BMb;t 1 +M
H
b;t 1,
where Bb;t denotes its prots. The term Ib;t (R
m
t   1) in (3.12) denotes costs
associated with the acquisition of new central bank money since the central
bank discounts eligible assets at the rate Rmt . A bank b collects deposits
from (patient) households Db;t = sDp;t, pays an interest RDt on them and
holds moneyMHb;t. Further, it holds government bonds Bb;t which deliver an
interest of RGt and supplies mortgage loans, B
M
b;t = (s 1)BMi;t at the interest
rate RLt . We assume that mortgage loans can in principle be traded friction-
lessly and at any amount between di¤erent nancial intermediaries. Thus,
in this model, they are equivalent to mortgage backed securities (MBS). The
term t(BMb;t ; Qb;t) denotes costs of supplying loans as an increasing func-
tion of the volume of loans supplied @t(BMb;t ; Qb;t)=@B
M
b;t > 0. As in Curdia
and Woodford (2011), we assume that these costs are further decreasing in
reserves, i.e. @t(BMb;t ; Qb;t)=@Qb;t < 0 where Qb;t = M
H
b;t 1 + Ib;t, inducing
a positive bank demand for high powered money.
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Both types of bank assets, i.e. treasuries and MBS, are assumed to be
eligible and can, therefore, be used to get new reserves from the central bank.
In accordance with the Feds pre-crisis money supply policy, we assume that
treasuries are fully eligible. We further assume that the central bank decides
in each period how much MBS are purchased. i.e. how much reserves are
supplied against MBS, for which it sets the instrument
 
zit   1

. We model
MBS purchases of the central bank as a random event, i.e. these purchases
are assumed to be unexpected and transitory. The central bank further sets
the price of money in terms of eligible assets Rmt , which we therefore call the
repo rate or the policy rate. Notably, the federal funds rate, which actually
served as the policy rate of the US Federal Reserve, closely relates to the
rate on treasury repurchase agreements before the nancial crisis, see e.g.
Bech et al. (2012). New money injections Ib;t that a bank receives from the
central bank are then limited by the money supply constraint (see Schabert
(2015) for a corresponding money supply constraint without MBS)
Ib;t  Bb;t 1
Rmt
+
 
zit   1
 BMb;t 1
Rmt
, (3.13)
where zit measures the (exogenously determined) MBS purchases by the
central bank, which will be quantied to match the Feds QE1 and QE3
programs. Below, we will describe in detail how the data generating process
for zit is chosen to match the size and the time pattern of the Feds MBS
purchases. Note that since the Fed only purchased Agency MBS in the
programs, the term
 
zit   1

will be measured by Agency MBS purchased
by the Fed as share of total Agency MBS outstanding. In the steady state,
we set zi = 1 such that only government bonds are eligible.
A bank b maximizes the present value of future prots
maxE0
1P
k=0
#t;t+k
B
b;t+k subject to its budget constraint (3.12) and the money
supply constraint (3.13), where #t;t+k denotes the stochastic discount factor
of banks. With #t;t+1 = #t;t+k+1=#t;t+k and t denoting the multiplier on
the money supply constraint of banks (3.13), the rst order conditions with
respect to deposits, government bonds, MBS, money holdings and injections
55
are given by
1
RDt
= Et
#t;t+1
t+1
; (3.14)
1
RGt
=
1
RDt

1 + Et
t+1
Rmt+1

; (3.15)
1
RLt
=
1
RDt
 
1 + Ett+1
 
zit+1   1

Rmt+1
!
  @t
@bMb;t
; (3.16)
1 =
1
RDt
  Et#t;t+1@t+1
@mHb;t
; (3.17)
Rmt = 1 
@t
@ib;t
  t; (3.18)
and the complementary slackness conditions
t
 
 ib;t+k + bb;t+k 1
t+kR
m
t+k
+
 
zit+k   1
 bMb;t+k 1
t+kR
m
t+k
!
= 0;
 ib;t+k + bb;t+k 1
t+kR
m
t+k
+
 
zit+k   1
 bMb;t+k 1
t+kR
m
t+k
 0; t  0:
Note, that the stochastic discount factor of banks will in equilibrium equal
the one of patient households (see (3.6) and (3.14)). We further get the
following relationships between the interest rates RDt , R
G
t and R
L
t . When
government bonds are not eligible or the money supply constraint (3.13) is
not binding, the interest rates on deposits and bonds are identical: RDt =
RGt . Otherwise, we get R
G
t < R
D
t due to the eligibility of bonds. Moreover,
since 1   zit+1   1, we have RGt < RLt due to the fact that mortgage
loans increase banking costs. When MBS are not eligible (zi = 1), the MBS
yield exceeds the deposit rate, RLt > R
D
t , due to the costs associated with
mortgage loans. Then, when MBS purchases are announced and become
eligible, the expected eligibility (Etzit+1 > 1) will reduce R
L
t , as can be
seen from (3.16), provided that the money supply constraint is expected
to be binding (Ett+1 > 0). Finally, equation (3.17) equates the costs of
holding deposits to the costs of holding money and equation (3.18) delivers
a condition, under which the money supply constraint is binding, t = 1  
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Rmt   @t@ib;t > 0 if 1   Rmt >
@t
@ib;t
or
 @t@ib;t  > Rmt   1, i.e. if the marginal
(negative) e¤ect of injections on banking costs is su¢ ciently large.
3.2.3 Firms
A continuum of perfectly competitive identical rms indexed with j produce
the intermediate good according to IOj;t =

nTj;t

, where  2 (0; 1). The
rm hires labor nTj;t at a common rate wt to produce its output IOj;t, which it
sells to the retailers at the price PJ;t. Hence a rm j solvesmaxPJ;t

nTj;t
 
Ptwtn
T
j;t leading to the rst order condition
PJ;t
 
nTj;t
 1
= Ptwt (3.19)
and to prots of (1  )PJ;t

nTj;t

that are distributed to the patient
households which are assumed to own these rms.
Price stickiness is introduced in a standard way. A continuum of mo-
nopolistically competitive retailers indexed with k buy intermediate goods
at the price PJ;t, re-package them according to IOt =
1R
0
IOj;tdj, di¤erentiate
them into yk;t = IOk;t and sell the distinct goods yk;t at the price Pk;t to
perfectly competitive bundlers. They bundle them to the nal good yt =
1R
0
y
 1

k;t dk
 
 1
, where  > 1, which is sold at the price Pt. Hence a retailer k
faces the demand function yk;t = (Pk;t=Pt)
  yt and sets its own price Pk;t ac-
cording to this and taking PJ;t as given. Following Calvo (1983), we assume
that each period only a fraction 1  of retailers is allowed to change his price.
The other fraction  2 [0; 1) adjusts the price according to full indexation to
the steady state ination rate: Pk;t = Pk;t 1. Dening eZt = P k;t=Pt with
the optimal price of retailers P k;t, the optimal real price can be written recur-
sively as eZt =  1Z1;t=Z2;t, with Z1;t = c cp;t ytmct + zt pEt  t+1  Z1;t+1
and Z2;t = c
 c
p;t yt+z

t 
pEt
 t+1

 1
Z2;t+1 (for details see Appendix 3.5.1).
Due to perfectly competitive bundlers, the aggregate price level Pt for
nal goods is given by P 1 t =
1R
0
P 1 k;t dk (zero prot condition) and can
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be written as P 1 t = (1  )

P k;t
1 
+ 1 P 1 t 1 , 1 = (1  ) eZ1 t +

 
t

 1 (see Appendix 3.5.1). Moreover, aggregate output is given by yt =
(nTt )

vt
where vt =
1R
0
(Pk;t=Pt)
  dk is a measure of price dispersion, which
can be written recursively as vt = (1  ) eZ t +   t  vt 1 (see Appendix
3.5.1). Prots of intermediate goods producing rms and retailers that are
distributed to a patient households p are collected in the term Ptp;t.
3.2.4 Public Sector
The treasury issues one-period bonds which are held by nancial intermedi-
aries Bb;t and the central bank BC;t. Hence, total demand for government
bonds in period t is given by Bt + BC;t with Bt =
R 1
0 Bb;tdb. As in Sch-
abert (2015), we assume that bonds are supplied following a simple rule
BT;t =  BT;t 1, where   > p is the growth rate of total government bonds.
The treasury receives seigniorage revenues from the central bank Ptmt and
pays lump-sum transfers Pt t = sPtp;t + (1  s)Pt i;t to households to
balance its budget
BT;t 1 + Pt t = BT;t=RGt + Pt
m
t ,
where we assume that transfers are identical for both types, p;t =  i;t.
The central bank supplies money outright MHt 1 =
R 1
0 M
H
b;t 1db and
through repurchase agreementsMRt =
R 1
0 M
R
b;tdb and holds treasuries, BC;t,and
MBS, BMC;t,that yield interest earnings. New money injections in each period
are given by It = MHt  MHt 1 +MRt , where It =
R 1
0 Ib;t 1db. The budget
constraint of the central bank reads
BC;t=R
G
t +B
M
C;t=R
L
t + Pt
m
t
= BC;t 1 +BMC;t 1 +R
m
t
 
MHt  MHt 1

+ (Rmt   1)MRt :
Assuming that the central bank transfers all its interest earnings given
by Ptmt =
 
1  1=RGt

BC;t +
 
1  1=RLt

BMC;t + (R
m
t   1)
 
MHt  MHt 1

+
(Rmt   1)MRt to the treasury, we get the following relationship between the
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evolution of assets held and money supplied by the central bank BC;t  
BC;t 1 + BMC;t   BMC;t 1 = MHt  MHt 1. Assuming that initial assets and
liabilities satisfy BC; 1 + BMC; 1 = M
H 1, the balance sheet of the central
bank reads
BC;t +B
M
C;t =M
H
t :
Finally, with the market clearing condition for government bonds as well
as BMC;t =
 
zit   1

BMb;t 1, the balance sheet can be written as BT;t   Bt + 
zit   1

BMb;t 1 = M
H
t . The policy rate is set by the central bank following
a feedback rule respecting the zero lower bound given by
Rmt = max
n
1;
 
Rmt 1
R (Rm)1 R (t=)(1 R) (yt=y)y(1 R)o ,
where variables without time index denote their steady state values, Rm > 1
is an average policy rate chosen by the central bank, 1 > R  0,   0 and
y  0: Given that we do not model real growth and that there is thus no
trend in real money demand (that would have to be accommodated by an
increasing outright money supply), the central bank sets the ration of money
supplied under repos to money supplied outright equal to one (MRt =M
H
t ),
which ensures non-negative injections in equilibrium.
3.2.5 Equilibrium
The labor market clears according to nTt = snp;t+(1  s)ni;t and consolida-
tion of budget constraints delivers the aggregate resource constraint
yt = t + scp;t + (1  s) ci;t
implying market clearing in the goods market. Finally, the market clear-
ing condition for the housing market with xed supply H holds shp;t +
(1  s)hi;t = H. The set of equilibrium conditions is summarized and the
equilibrium is dened in Appendix 3.5.2.
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3.3 MBS Purchases in QE1 and QE3
In this section, we evaluate the Feds MBS purchases applying the model
developed in the previous section. First, we study the purchases during
the QE1 program, announced on November 25, 2008, where credit markets
were disrupted and MBS yields had risen markedly (see e.g. Hancock and
Passmore, 2011). Moreover, the federal funds rate reached its zero lower
bound at that time. To account for these circumstances before QE1, we
simulate a crisis using a banking cost shock and a discount rate shock.
The former captures the rise in MBS yields and the latter makes the zero
lower bound binding. Second, we examine the MBS purchases in the QE3
program in 2012, where the functioning of mortgage markets had improved
substantially (see e.g. Hancock and Passmore, 2015). Therefore, here we
only use the discount rate shock to make the zero lower bound binding. To
derive a solution of the model including the possibility that the zero lower
bound is binding, we use the OccBin toolkit by Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2015b) for Dynare (2011), which facilitates the analysis of an occasionally
binding constraint. Before these analyses are conducted, we describe how
the model is calibrated.
3.3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated using standard parameter values whenever it is
possible, to facilitate comparisons. We further calibrate the remaining pa-
rameters that describe the processes governing the MBS purchases using
detailed information of the Feds purchase programs and the parameters of
the banking cost function to replicate unconditional moments of MBS yields
as well as their responses to the policy intervention using evidence provided
by Hancock and Passmore (2011, 2015).
One time period is assumed to be a quarter. To calculate the long run
values of the rates we consider, we use quarterly US data from the FRED
database for the time period 1990Q1 to 2008Q3, excluding data of the recent
nancial crisis. The reason for beginning in 1990Q1 is that after the mid-
1980s the housing nance system was restructured and the mortgage market
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got better integrated into the capital market (see e.g. Iacoviello, 2004). As
we interpret the rate RL as the MBS yield, for which we have no data, we
calculate its mean as follows. Hancock and Passmore (2011) argue that the
mortgage rate is a mark-up over the MBS yield, and report a mean MBS
yield for the time period July 2000 to March 2004, which is 5.95%. In this
time period the mean 30-year xed mortgage rate is 6.57%, i.e. it is by
a factor 1:1 larger than the MBS yield. Assuming that this mark-up is a
time-invariant value for the entire sample and using the mean mortgage rate
for 1990Q1 to 2008Q3 (7.34%), the resulting MBS yield is 6.64% annually
and 1.62% quarterly for the time period 1990Q1 to 2008Q3. In the US,
the mean net ination rate and the means of the empirical counterparts
of the monetary policy rate, the treasury bill rate, the deposit rate and
the MBS yield between 1990Q1 and 2008Q3 are given by    1 = 0:46%,
Rm   1 = 1:06%, RG   1 = 1:09%, RD   1 = 1:10%, and RL   1 = 1:62%.3
Given the values for the long run ination and deposit rates, the discount
factor of patient households follows from equation (3.6), implying p =

RD
= 0:9937. We set the fraction of constrained consumers to 0:4, i.e.
s = 0:6, which is in the range of what Kaplan et al. (2014) estimate for
the share of hand-to-mouth consumers in the US. Following Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2015a), we set the utility parameters to c = h = n = 1,
implying a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 1 and log utility in consumption
and housing. The parameters n and h are calibrated such that total hours
worked in the steady state is nT = 0:33 and housing wealth to quarterly GDP
is phH=y = 6 as total housing wealth to annual GDP is about 1:5 in the US
(see Iacoviello, 2009) implying n = 5:9 and h = 0:055.
The total housing stock is normalized to 1 and the parameters concern-
ing the production sector are set to  = 2=3,  = 0:75,  = 21 following
Iacoviello (2005). We further need to assign values for the discount factor
of impatient households i and the pledgeable fraction of housing . For
this, we follow also Iacoviello (2005), who summarizes some estimates of the
discount factors and concludes that i = 0:95 is an appropriate value for im-
patient householdsdiscount rate, which is adopted here. We further apply
3See Appendix 3.5.4 for further details on the data and their sources.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Parameter Calibration.
Description Source/Target Parameter Value
Discount factor patient households =RD p 0:9937
Discount factor impatient households Iaco. (2005) i 0:95
Pledgeable fraction of housing Iaco. (2005)  0:55
Share of the patient households KVW (2014) s 0:6
Inverse of Frisch elasticity G&I (2015a) n 1
Inverse of IES in consumption G&I (2015a) c 1
Inverse of IES in housing G&I (2015a) h 1
Weight of housing in utility ph=y = 6 h 0:055
Weight of labor in utility nT = 0:33 n 5:9
Production function Iaco. (2005)  2=3
Price rigidity Iaco. (2005)  0:75
Elasticity of substitution Iaco. (2005)  21
Fixed housing supply normalized H 1
Banking cost function RL   1 = 1:62%  0:001
Banking cost function 16 bp drop in RL  0:5
his estimate for the pledgeable fraction of housing for impatient households
and set  = 0:55.
We consider the following cost function of banks
t = z

t 
 
bMb;t
mHt 1=t + it
!
,
where zt denotes a banking cost shock following log z

t =  log z

t 1 + "t
with "t  n:i:d:
 
0; 2

and 0 <  < 1, as in Christo¤el and Schabert
(2015), which we will use for the simulation of the nancial crisis. The
parameters of the cost function,  and , are set as follows. We calibrate
the level parameter  to match average MBS yields between 1990Q1 and
2008Q3, i.e. such that in the steady state RL   1 = 1:62% is matched. The
calibration of the elasticity parameter  is based on the following empirical
results. According to Hancock and Passmore (2011), annual MBS yields fell
between the announcement of QE1 in November 2008 and the start of the
actual purchases in January 2009 by about 0:69 percentage points. This
69 basis points decline in the annual rate corresponds to a 16 basis points
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Figure 3.2: Responses to Crisis Shocks (without Policy Interventions) Pre-
ceding QE1.
decline per quarter, which we apply as one calibration target. Moreover,
Hancock and Passmore (2015) nd for MBS purchases during QE3 that
weekly purchases of $10 billion in June 2013 reduced annual MBS yields
by 0.5 basis points weekly. On a quarterly basis, this would mean that a
purchase of $120 billion in 2013Q3 reduced annual MBS yields by 6 basis
points corresponding to a decline of 1:5 basis points in quarterly yields, which
is our second target. We apply a value for  such that our model matches
both of these empirically observed yields e¤ects during QE1 and QE3. The
resulting parameter values for the banking cost function are  = 0:001 and
 = 0:5. Our baseline calibration is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3.2 Financial Crisis and Zero Lower Bound
The circumstances, under which MBS purchases took place, can be summa-
rized as follows. QE1 was preceded by the nancial crisis that led to large
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drops in output, ination and the policy rate, which hit its zero lower bound
and remained there for a long time period. Moreover, it led to a rise in MBS
yields. More precisely, according to Hancock and Passmore (2014), during
the crisis period, annual MBS yields were on average 63 basis points higher
than what their normal pricing regression predicts. This corresponds to 15
basis points in quarterly yields. In contrast, the purchases in QE3 were
conducted in an environment where the economy had recovered mainly but
where the zero lower bound was still binding. To simulate scenarios that
account for these circumstances, we use the discount factor shock and the
banking cost shock.4
Our simulation of the nancial crisis preceding QE1 is shown in Figure
3.2. In this simulation, we aim at replicating the 15 basis points increase in
MBS yields together with a large drop in output and ination that leads to a
binding zero lower bound for a time period that at least spans the purchase
period. We achieve this with a banking cost shock with a magnitude of
"0 = 0:35 and an autocorrelation of  = 0:95 together with a discount rate
shock with a magnitude of "0 = 0:004 and an autocorrelation of  = 0:99.
The zero lower bound binds for 10 quarters spanning the purchases in QE1.
For QE3, we only use the discount rate shock (with "0 = 0:006) to make
the zero lower bound binding for 11 quarters since the purchases during
QE3 span 10 quarters. Note, that the timing is such that the shocks for
the simulation of the economic environments before the purchase programs
occur in period 0 and the announcements of the purchases will take place in
period 1.
3.3.3 Simulating the Feds MBS Purchases
QE1 We dene 2008Q4 when the MBS purchases rst were announced, as
the rst quarter of QE1. Table 3.2 shows the MBS purchases of the Fed in
billions of dollars as well as relative to total agency MBS outstanding.
As can be seen in Table 3.2, total purchases at the end of the QE1
program exceeded $500 billion, which was the stated volume in the rst
4Plots of impulse response functions of selected variables to these shocks are given and
described in Appendix 3.5.5.
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Table 3.2: FED MBS Purchases and Shock Processes in QE1.
Quarter 08Q4 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 Total
Quarter of QE1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7
MBS Purchases in:
$ billions 0 236 231 225 216 160 49 1117
% of total AMBS 0 4:7 4:5 4:3 4:0 2:9 0:9 21
zi;QE1t   1 0 0:047 0:045 0:042 0:037 0:03 0:022
announcement. This is due to the fact that the Fed expanded the program
after the rst announcement while it was running. On March 18, 2009,
the Fed announced that it would expand the program and purchase "up to
an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities" (FOMC,
2009). Hence, to approximate the observed MBS purchases, given by the
black solid line in Figure 3.3, by the shock zit, we have to split it into two
parts, the initially announced (labeled with A) and the expansion (labeled
with B). To approximate these paths, we have to take a closer look into the
announcements. Concerning the volume of the initially announced program
the Feds press release noties that "purchases of up to $500 billion in MBS
will be conducted" and concerning the duration of the program that it is
"expected to take place over several quarters" (Fed, 2008). In accordance
with this, we approximate the initially announced part of the program by
an AR(1) process given by log

zi;At

= Ai log

zi;At 1

+ "i;At 1. We set "
i;A
1 =
0:047 such that the initial purchase equals the observed one and Ai = 0:54
such that this part of the program in isolation leads to signicant purchases
over six quarters adding up to 10% of total US Agency MBS outstanding,
which is what $500 billion made up in 2008Q4. This process A is depicted
by the dashed-dotted green line in Figure 3.3.
For the second part of the program that was announced towards the
end of 2009Q1 (labeled with B), we assume that actual purchases started
in the subsequent quarter, namely 2009Q2. Hence, we also model this
shock as an announced one. This second shock is used to approximate
the actual purchases from 2009Q2 to 2010Q2 given the AR(1) process of
the rst shock. For this, we have to assume an AR(2) process given by
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Figure 3.3: Observed Purchases during QE1 in % of Total US Agency MBS
Outstanding and their Approximation through zi;QE1t .
log

zi;Bt

= B1;i log

zi;Bt 1

+ B2;i log

zi;Bt 2

+ "i;Bt 1, with "
i;B
1 = 0:0195,
B1;i = 1:45, and 
B
2;i =  0:6. The process B is shown by the dotted blue line
in Figure 3.3. The process for zi;QE1t as the aggregate QE1 shock process is
the sum of the two processes given by zi;QE1t = z
i;A
t + z
i;B
t . It is depicted by
the dashed red line in Figure 3.3 and approximates the observed purchases
(black solid line) quite well.
We model the shocks as announced shocks since the purchase programs of
the Fed, during QE1 as well as QE3, exhibited a lag between the announce-
ment of the program and its implementation of one period. In accordance
with this practice, a shock "it > 0 will not a¤ect z
i
t but z
i
t+1, i.e. MBS
purchases and injections will only be a¤ected with a one-period delay. Nev-
ertheless, knowing that the shock has occurred in t, agents can react and
hence, in particular, RLt will respond to the shock in period t even without
any change in MBS purchases and injections.
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Table 3.3: FED MBS Purchases and Shock Processes in QE3.
Quarter 12Q4 13Q1 13Q2 13Q3 13Q4 14Q1 14Q2 14Q3 14Q4 Total
Q. of QE3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10
Purch. in:
$ billions 92 144 137 134 155 106 61 42 31 902
% AMBS 1:6 2:5 2:4 2:3 2:6 1:8 1:0 0:7 0:5 15
zi;QE3t   1 0:016 0:024 0:026 0:025 0:022 0:017 0:013 0:008 0:003
Figure 3.4: Observed Purchases during QE3 in % of Total US Agency MBS
Outstanding and their Approximation through zi;QE3t .
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QE3 The announcement of MBS purchases as part of QE3 was made on
September 13, 2012. Hence, we take 2012Q3 as the announcement period
of the MBS purchase program during QE3. In Table 3.3 again absolute and
relative MBS purchases by the Fed are shown. We see that from quarter 2 to
6 of the intervention period of QE3 the purchases were smaller than in the
corresponding quarters in QE1. Moreover, the total purchases were smaller
in QE3 in absolute ( 9021117  0:8) as well as relative terms (0:150:21  0:71). The
di¤erence in relative terms is larger since the amount of total Agency MBS
outstanding was larger during the QE3 period. We approximate the ob-
served MBS purchase program during QE3 by an AR(2) process for zit given
by log

zi;QE3t

= i;1 log

zi;QE3t 1

+i;2 log

zi;QE3t 1

+"it 1, with "i1 = 0:016,
i;1 = 1:5 and i;1 =  0:605. Observed purchases in QE3 and their approx-
imation are shown in Figure 3.4. Again our shock process approximates
observed purchases quite well.
3.3.4 E¤ects of MBS Purchases at the Zero Lower Bound
In this section, we present quantitative results regarding the macroeconomic
e¤ects of the approximated Feds MBS purchases. The analysis is conducted
separately for the purchases in QE1 and QE3, where we treat the policy
interventions as realization of two distinct specications of data generating
processes for the particular policy instrument zit.
QE1 Figure 3.5 shows the reaction of selected variables to the MBS pur-
chase shock zi;QE1t . The gure is constructed as follows. First, we simulate
the nancial crisis with the banking cost shock and the shock to the dis-
count factor of patient households, as described in Section 3.3.2. The zero
lower bound is binding for 10 quarters as of the crisis period, i.e. it spans
the whole purchase period. Then we let the economy return to its steady
state. In a second simulation, we use the same shocks as before and add the
MBS purchase shock zi;QE1t in the period subsequent to the crisis shocks, i.e.
period 1. The lines in Figure 3.5 show the di¤erence between the reactions
of the selected variables for the simulation with MBS purchase compared
to the simulation without it. Hence, it shows the isolated e¤ects stemming
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from the MBS purchase shock.
Our results indicate that in response to the MBS purchase shock that
mimics the observed program of the Fed during QE1, GDP and total con-
sumption increased by 0.63%, and total hours even by 0.95% in the an-
nouncement period, where MBS yields dropped by 16 basis points in accor-
dance with Hancock and Passmore (2011). Note that MBS yields already
fell in the announcement period without purchases due to the expected eli-
gibility of MBS. In the subsequent period, where 4.7% of total Agency MBS
outstanding were purchased, the reactions became even larger and reached
their maximum. In this period, the increase in GDP was 1.12%, in total
consumption 1.13%, in total hours worked 1.67%, and ination 0.45%.
In the second period, MBS yields fell by 34 basis points since additional
MBS were purchased. This led to an increase in house prices (+0.66%)
and hence borrowing (MBS: +5.72%), which enabled constrained impatient
households, who have a higher propensity to consume out of wealth, to in-
crease consumption (+2.19%) and housing (+5.36%). Moreover, borrowers
benetted from debt deation since MBS purchases led to an unexpected
rise in ination. On the other hand, since the deposit rate decreased with
banking costs and MBS yields, patient households saved less, consumed
more and also worked more (+2.44%) due to fewer interest earnings.
We further compute cumulative e¤ects for the horizon of 9 quarters,
for which the zero lower bound is binding. We nd that over this horizon
GDP increased by 2.24%, total consumption by 2.36%, and total hours
worked by 3.36%. To sum up, MBS purchases of the central bank had
expansionary e¤ects on consumption, employment, and output since they
benetted impatient households with a high marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth.
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows another important e¤ect of MBS purchases,
the increase in ination with a maximum increase in the gross ination rate
of 0.45% in the second quarter of the intervention. Hence, central bank asset
purchases have dampened the deationary e¤ects from the crisis shock.
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Figure 3.5: E¤ects of MBS Purchases in QE1.
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Figure 3.6: E¤ects of MBS Purchases in QE3.
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QE3 Figure 3.6 shows the reaction of selected variables to the MBS pur-
chase shock zi;QE3t . This gure is constructed in the same way as Figure
3.5 with the exception that here the banking cost shock was not used (see
Section 3.3.2). Moreover, the zero lower bound is binding here for 10 quar-
ters as of the announcement of QE3 since the purchase program spanned 10
quarters.
In contrast to the e¤ects in QE1, the responses of macroeconomic vari-
ables to the MBS purchase program in QE3 are largest in the announcement
period, although the response of MBS yields is hump-shaped. In QE3, the
maximum increase of GDP was 0.86%, of total consumption 0.85%, of total
hours worked 1.28%, and of ination 0.45%. As the cumulative e¤ects for
the horizon of 10 quarters indicate, MBS purchases during QE3 increased
GDP by 1.62%, total consumption by 1.69%, and total hours worked by
2.43% in total.
Comparison of QE1 and QE3 In each period of QE3, the drop in MBS
yields was smaller than in QE1 and in total smoother. The reason is that the
purchases in periods 2 to 6 of the intervention were smaller in QE3 compared
to QE1 and that total MBS purchases in QE3 relative to total Agency MBS
outstanding amounted to only about 70% of the purchases during QE1 (15%
in QE3 vs. 21% in QE1). Moreover, the reaction of aggregate variables was
largest in the announcement period in QE3, while in QE1 they reached
their maximum in the second period of the intervention. This is due to the
fact that the Fed expanded the program in QE1 while it was running. The
second announcement in 2009Q1 had further expansionary e¤ects. With
QE1, the Fed reacted with a program containing a few MBS purchases of
large size to rapidly counteract the rise in MBS yields and help the housing
market to stabilize. In contrast, the QE3 program in 2012 was conducted
when the economic situation was far better than in 2008. The program
spanned a longer time period (10 quarters) and showed roughly constant
purchases. The path of the purchases in QE3 was announced more clearly
with announced purchases of $40 billion each month. Hence, not only the
size of the purchase program but also its timing and its announcement are
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important for its e¤ectiveness. To sum up, MBS purchase programs have
successfully stimulated aggregate demand, output, and prices.
3.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we provide a sensitivity analysis. We vary the curvature
parameter of housing in the utility function and set it to h = 2. We only
compare the results for QE1 since this was the program with larger volume
and larger e¤ects. We have to adapt the parameters h,  and  to induce
a steady state ratio of housing wealth to GDP of ph=y = 6, a steady state
net MBS yield of RL   1 = 1:62%, and a drop of 16 basis points in MBS
yields in the announcement period. Therefore, we set these parameters to
h = 0:059,  = 0:00185, and  = 0:58.
For this parametrization, the e¤ects of MBS purchases on aggregate vari-
ables in QE1 are slightly larger. The maximum increases in output, total
consumption, and hours worked, which are reached in period 2, are 1:2%,
1:23%, and 1:8%, respectively, and the cumulative increases are 2:31%, 2:6%,
and 3:47%, respectively. What are the reasons for these larger e¤ects? On
the one hand, the higher value for h leads to a smaller reaction of housing
demand (borrowers: +3.49% vs. +5.36%). Consequently, borrowing (MBS)
increases less than in the benchmark calibration (+3.84% vs. +5.72%). On
the other hand, the higher value for h strengthens the e¤ects on consump-
tion (borrowers: +2.65% vs. +2.19%) and hours worked (lenders: +2.82%
vs. +2.44%). In sum, the larger reaction of consumption and hours worked
outweighs the smaller increase in borrowing, which leads to larger expan-
sionary e¤ects on aggregate variables.
3.4 Conclusion
After the nancial crisis, the Fed implemented for the rst time in its his-
tory unconventional policy measures, like purchases of mortgage-backed se-
curities. Hence, the discussion about the e¤ectiveness of these types of
interventions is vivid. This chapter provides an analysis that quanties the
e¤ects of MBS purchases of the Fed in the QE programs on macroeconomic
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variables. Our results suggest that MBS purchases by the Fed had non-
negligible e¤ects on macroeconomic variables. Specically, our results indi-
cate that MBS purchases during QE1 increased GDP and total consumption
by 0.63%, and total hours worked by 0.95% in the announcement period. In
the second quarter, where purchases started and the program was expanded,
the program had its maximum e¤ects with increases in GDP, consumption,
hours worked, and ination of 1.12%, 1.13%, 1.67%, and 0.45%, respectively.
Moreover, we nd that in total the QE1 MBS purchase program increased
GDP by 2.24%, total consumption by 2.36%, and total hours worked by
3.36%.
For QE3, we nd that the program led to a maximum quarterly increase
in GDP of 0.86%, in consumption of 0.85%, in hours worked of 1.28%, and
in ination of 0.45% in the announcement period. Moreover, the cumulative
e¤ects in QE3 summed up to an increase of 1.62% in GDP, of 1.69% in total
consumption, and of 2.43% in total hours worked.
Reserves that were supplied to banks in exchange for MBS reduced bank-
ing costs and hence MBS yields which in turn increased house prices. This
positive wealth e¤ect for borrowers with a high marginal propensity to con-
sume out of wealth let them increase consumption. On the other hand,
lenders increased labor supply due to lower interest earnings. In total, con-
sumption, hours worked and GDP increased. Moreover, the MBS purchases
led to an increase in ination suggesting that they have been useful to coun-
teract deationary e¤ects of the crisis.
As our analyses showed, not only the size but also the construction of
the purchase program is important for its e¤ectiveness. Therefore, questions
concerning the timing and the design of tapering could be addressed with
this type of model, which is left for future research.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Details of the FirmsProblem
RetailersPrice
The price setting problem of a retailer reads
@
@Pk;t
Et
( 1X
s=0
sqt;t+s (
sPk;t   PJ;t+s)

Pk;t
Pt+s
 
yt+s
)
= 0
with the stochastic discount factor qt;t+s =

zt 
p
s
Et
c 
c
p;t+s
c 
c
p;t
Pt
Pt+s
leading to
the rst order condition for the optimal price P k;t
P k;t =

  1
Et
1P
s=0
sqt;t+s (
s)  P t+syt+sPJ;t+s
Et
1P
s=0
sqt;t+s (s)
1  P t+syt+s
. (3.20)
Inserting qt;t+s =

zt 
p
s
Et
c 
c
p;t+s
c 
c
p;t
Pt
Pt+s
and marginal costs of retailers mct =
PJ;t
Pt
, (3.20) can be written as
P k;t =

  1
Et
1P
s=0

zt 
p
s
c 
c
p;t+s (
s)  P t+syt+smct+s
Et
1P
s=0

zt 
p
s
c 
c
p;t+s (
s)1  P  1t+s yt+s
. (3.21)
We dene eZt = P k;t=Pt such that we can rewrite the denominator and the
numerator of (3.21) recursively as eZt =  1Z1;t=Z2;t, with Z1;t = c cp;t ytmct+
zt 
pEt
 t+1


Z1;t+1 and Z2;t = c
 c
p;t yt + z

t 
pEt
 t+1

 1
Z2;t+1.
Aggregate Price Level
The aggregate price level Pt for nal goods is given by P 1 t =
1R
0
P 1 k;t dk
due to perfectly competitive bundlers (zero prot condition). Since all retail
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prices were set according to (3.20) in the past, we can write this as
P 1 t =
1Z
0
P 1 k;t dk = (1  )
1X
s=0
s
 
sP k;t s
1 
= (1  )  P k;t1  + 1 P 1 t 1 .
Hence the aggregate price level is given by
P 1 t = (1  )
 
P k;t
1 
+ 1 P 1 t 1
) 1 = (1  ) eZ1 t +  t  1 . (3.22)
Aggregate Output
Aggregate output of intermediate goods producers who behave identically
is given by IOt =
 
nTt

. Moreover, IOt =
1R
0
IOk;tdk =
1R
0
yk;tdk holds due
to market clearing. Equalizing these equations for intermediate output and
inserting yk;t = (Pk;t=Pt)
  yt, we get
 
nTt

=
1R
0
(Pk;t=Pt)
  ytdk , yt =
(nTt )

vt
where vt =
1R
0
(Pk;t=Pt)
  dk is a measure of price dispersion. With the
assumption that there is no initial price dispersion, we can write vt as
vt = (1  )
1X
l=0
l

lP k;t l=Pt
 
,
where P k;t is the optimal price set by the price adjusting rms at time t.
This term can further be simplied with vt
vt = (1  )
1X
l=0
l

lP k;t l=Pt
 
= (1  )
1X
l=0
l

l
  eZ t l lY
s=1
t+1 s
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with eZt = P k;t=Pt and 1P
l=1
lQ
s=1
t+1 s =
1P
l=1
(Pt l=Pt) . Taking di¤erences,
we can write vt in a more compact recursive way:
vt    tvt 1 = (1  ) eZ t , vt = (1  ) eZ t +  t  vt 1.
3.5.2 Equilibrium
Denition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences fcp;t;
hp;t; np;t; ci;t; hi;t; ni;t; ph;t; wt; t; !t; b
M
i;t ; R
m
t ; R
G
t ; R
D
t ; R
L
t ; t; t; b
M
t ;
mHt ; #t;t+1; it; bt; n
T
t ; mct; eZt; Z1;t; Z2;t; yt; vt; bT;t; mRt ;  tg1t=0 satisfying
the optimality conditions of patient households
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 c
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p;t+1ph;t+1; (3.23)
nn
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1
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c
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c 
c
p;t t+1
, (3.25)
impatient households
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h
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i;t ph;t   iEtc 
c
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c 
c
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+ !t; (3.28)
ci;t + ph;t [hi;t   hi;t 1] +
bMi;t
RLt
=
bMi;t 1
t
+ wtni;t +  t; (3.29)
bMi;t =  Ett+1ph;t+1hi;t; if !t > 0; (3.30)
or bMi;t >  Ett+1ph;t+1hi;t; if !t = 0; (3.31)
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banks
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1 = (1  ) eZ1 t +  t  1 ; (3.48)
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the conditions for the treasury
bT;t =  
bT;t 1
t
; (3.49)
bT;t 1
t
+  t =
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RGt
+

1  1
RGt

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+

1  1
RLt
 
zit   1

bMt 1 + (R
m
t   1)
 
mHt  
mHt 1
t
+mRt
!
;
the central bank
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R (Rm)1 R (t=)(1 R) (yt=y)y(1 R) (3.54)
the market clearing conditions
yt = t + scp;t + (1  s) ci;t (3.55)
H = shp;t + (1  s)hi;t (3.56)
and transversality conditions, given the xed housing supply H, initial values
b 1 > 0; bT; 1 > 0; mH 1 > 0;  1 > 0; v 1 = 1, and the exogenous processes
for f zt ; zit; zt g1t=0 and i.i.d. innovations with mean zero f"t ; "it; "t g1t=0
and @t
@bMt
=  t
bMt
; @t
@mHt 1
=   t
t(mHt 1=t+it)
; and @t@it =   tmHt 1=t+it :
3.5.3 Steady State
The deterministic steady state follows from the equilibrium dened above.
The steady state value of each variable is given by the variable where the
time index is dropped. We can reduce the equilibrium conditions for the
steady state as follows. First, consider der rmsoptimality conditions eZt =

 1Z1;t=Z2;t; where Z1 =
c 
c
p y mc
1 p and Z2 =
c 
c
p y
1 p in the steady state.
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Hence, we get eZ =  1mc and with the steady state mark-up of  1 )
mc =  1 ) eZ = 1. From this, we get v = (1 ) eZ 1  = 1 and hence
y =
 
nT

. Moreover, the policy rate rule delivers Rm = Rm > 1, the bond
supply rule  =   and we get RD = p from the patient households, and
# = p from the banksrst order conditions. Finally, we have mR = mH .
The values of fcp; hp; np; ci; hi; ni; ph; w; !; bMi ; RG; RL; ; ; bM ; mH ;
i; b; nT ; y; bT ; g that satisfy the conditions (3.57)-(3.78) mark the steady
state of the model:
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mH = bT   b (3.75)
y = + scp + (1  s) ci (3.76)
H = shp + (1  s)hi (3.77)
 = 

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with @
@bM
=  
bM
; @
@mH
=   
(mH=+i)
; and @@i =   mH=+i , given parame-
ter values for i and RD > RG ensuring a binding borrowing and money
supply constraint, respectively, in the steady state.
3.5.4 Data
In this section, we briey describe the data used in this study. Our main
source is the FRED database (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
To calibrate the long run value of Rm, we use the time series on the
e¤ective federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS), of RD the three-month certicate
of deposit (CD3M), of RG the one-year treasury constant maturity rate
(DGS1), and of  the GDP implicit price deator (GDPDEF). Moreover, as
described in the text, for the approximation of RL, we use the 30-year xed
mortgage rate (MORTGAGE30US ).
To calibrate the shock processes, we use the time series on mortgage-
backed securities held by the Federal Reserve (MBST) from FRED and the
time series on US Agency MBS outstanding from the website of the Securi-
ties Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) (www.sifma.org).
Finally, we use the GDP time series from FRED to get MBS held by the
Fed in percent on GDP as it is shown in Figure 3.1.
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3.5.5 Impulse Response Functions
The impulse responses displayed in the gures below show deviations of
each variable xt from its steady state value x, i.e. xobst = 100 log xt=x, in
response to shocks of one standard deviation. As an exception variables
with a star (*) show deviations in basis points, variables with two stars (**)
deviations in levels, and variables with three stars (***) levels. We consider
shocks that are su¢ ciently small to ensure a binding borrowing constraint
for impatient households (3.7) and a binding money supply constraint (3.13).
The standard deviations for the shocks are set to  = 0:006 and  = 0:1
and the parameters of autocorrelation of the shock processes to  = 0:7
and  = 0:95. The IRFs refer to the benchmark calibration given in Table
3.1.
The IRFs of the shock to the discount factor, "t > 0, are shown in Figure
3.7. This shock leads to a drop in the deposit rate as well as in consumption
and output since the patient households become more patient and delay
consumption. Thus, employment and ination decrease as well. The drop
in output and ination lead to a large drop in the policy rate. Thats why
this shock is e¤ective in making the zero lower bound binding. This shock
has contractionary e¤ects on consumption, employment, and output.
As Figure 3.8 shows, the banking cost shock, "t > 0, lets banks increase
money holdings and reduce loan supply in order to o¤set the increase in
banking costs. Hence, MBS yields rise and house prices fall. This tight-
ens the collateral constraint of borrowers, !t increases, who reduce their
consumption and housing. In total, the shock has contractionary e¤ects on
output and consumption as well as on wages and ination.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse response functions to a shock to the discount factor of
patient households. Percentage deviations from steady state, except for: *
deviation in basis points, ** deviation in levels, and *** in levels.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse response functions to a shock to the discount factor of
patient households. Percentage deviations from steady state, except for: *
deviation in basis points, ** deviation in levels.
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Chapter 4
Countercyclical Fiscal
Multipliers
4.1 Introduction
One central issue of scal policy analysis is how an increase in government
spending a¤ects output. More specically, the question is how large the
government spending multiplier with respect to output is, i.e. how large
the increase in output in dollar terms in response to a one dollar increase
in government spending is. Recent studies indicate that the size of govern-
ment spending multipliers depends on the state of the economy. Hence, the
new question researchers put forward is when rather than whether govern-
ment spending multipliers are large. Specically, recent empirical papers
suggest that the size of multipliers di¤ers over the business cycle. For in-
stance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) deliver empirical evidence for
countercyclical multipliers in the US, using a regime-switching vector autore-
gression model. Moreover, using annual data for nineteen OECD countries,
Tagkalakis (2008) shows that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy is higher in
recessions due to binding borrowing constraints.1
1For further empirical evidence on countercyclical scal multipliers see e.g. Baum and
Koester (2011), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Batini et al. (2012), Mittnik and Semmler
(2012), Baum et al. (2012), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Candelon and Lieb
(2013), Fazzari et al. (2015), and Caggiano et al. (2015).
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While empirical evidence on the cyclicality of multipliers is growing,
there are only a few papers with theoretical models that can generate and
explain countercyclical government spending multipliers. The aim of this
chapter is to provide a theoretical model based on occasionally binding col-
lateral constraints that illustrates a mechanism leading to countercyclical
multipliers and to quantify the di¤erences in multipliers in recessions and
expansions on the grounds of this model. Our approach is in the lines of
Tagkalakis (2008), who suggests borrowing constraints for explaining coun-
tercyclical multipliers. We implement this idea in a New Keynesian DSGE
model with two types of households, patient Ricardian and impatient non-
Ricardian collateral constrained households, whose borrowing limits are tied
to the value of their houses, as in Iacoviello (2005). This collateral constraint
builds the key element of our analysis since it is occasionally binding and
hence leads to a non-linearity in our model. We show that in a situation
in which the collateral constraint binds, which is the case in our recession
scenario, a scal stimulus is more e¤ective than in a situation where it does
not bind, which is the case in our expansion scenario. The intuition for this
result is that in the expansion scenario impatient households are less sensi-
tive to changes in disposable income since their collateral constraint is not
binding. A slack collateral constraint means that the household is at its un-
constrained optimum and hence largely insensitive to changes in disposable
income. On the contrary, in the recession scenario, impatient households
nd themselves at their borrowing limit and thus at their constrained op-
timum, which means that they consume less than they would if they could
borrow more. Therefore, in the recession, their decisions are substantially
a¤ected by their current disposable income.
We observe the following e¤ects on disposable income. First, a scal
shock raises wages as a consequence of price rigidity, which leads to a larger
increase in consumption and housing of impatient households in recessions.
Second, in recessions the higher housing stock of impatient households to-
gether with an increase or, at least, a smaller drop in house prices boosts
the borrowing limit of impatient households, which amplies and prolongs
the initial stimulus. This is what we label as collateral e¤ect. In contrast,
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in expansions, the borrowing limit even decreases due to a large house price
drop. Third, impatient households benet from an unexpected increase in
ination in response to the government spending shock, which deates their
debt. On the contrary, depending on the nancing of government spending,
higher taxes eventually lower disposable income. These changes in dispos-
able income a¤ect substantially the decisions of impatient households in
recessions, while they are largely insensitive to them in expansions.
The evaluation of our model concerning the analysis of government spend-
ing multipliers in expansions and recessions is conducted as follows. First,
we simulate expansion and recession scenarios that are representative for
the US. For the time period after World War II, the average expansion led
to an increase in the cyclical component of real GDP by 2  2:5%, which we
match when simulating a representative expansion scenario. For the simu-
lation of a representative recession scenario, we use the same shock series
as for the expansion scenario, but with negative sign. We nd that for the
expansion scenario the collateral constraint becomes slack, while it binds in
the recession scenario. Then, we compute multipliers for the same govern-
ment spending shock, rst, when it occurs in the expansion scenario and,
second, when it occurs in the recession scenario and compare them. The
quantitative results of our model calibrated to US data can be summarized
as follows. First, we nd a large di¤erence in the impact multiplier, which
is considerably larger than 1 in recessions, while it is about 1 in expansions
(1:6 vs. 1:04). Second, cumulative multipliers for the horizon of 1 year and 2
years are 1:47 and 1:18, respectively, in recessions, whereas the correspond-
ing multipliers are 0:89 and 0:74, respectively, in expansions. Again, the
di¤erences are quite large with 64% for the horizon of 1 year and still 60%
for 2 years. We provide sensitivity analyses for a large range for key para-
meters and nd that the di¤erences in recession and expansion multipliers
remain considerably large.
Besides the aforementioned empirical literature, this chapter relates to
theoretical work on state-dependent government spending multipliers. One
state of the economy that leads to large government spending multipliers and
that has been focused on recently is an economic environment in which the
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nominal interest rate is stuck at the zero lower bound (see e.g. Eggertsson
(2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Woodford (2011), and Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2015)). Multipliers are large in this environment since the interest
rate cannot counteract the e¤ects of a scal stimulus. However, this state oc-
curs very infrequent and did not matter until the recent nancial crisis in the
US. Moreover, Canzoneri et al. (2015) analyze countercyclical government
spending multipliers in the presence of nancial frictions. In a model with
countercyclical bank intermediation costs, they nd countercyclical multi-
pliers of about 2 for recessions and about 1 for expansions, which is roughly
consistent with what we nd. One drawback of their approach is that they
have to rely on countercyclical banking costs at the outset.
Further, this chapter extends the approach used in several papers, like
e.g. Gali et al. (2007), which incorporate rule-of-thumb households into
standard DSGE models. Depending on the fraction of these households,
these models are capable of generating large multipliers, but not state-
dependent ones. Another important drawback of their approach is that
it relies on an ad-hoc constraint, which implies that a fraction of house-
holds do not borrow or save at all. In contrast, in our approach, both
types of households are optimizing and have access to credit markets. The
collateral constraint is the outcome of a costly enforcement problem be-
tween borrowers and savers and hence endogenous. Moreover, including
collateral constrained rather than rule-of-thumb households in DSGE mod-
els seems empirically more relevant. Kaplan et al. (2014) estimate that a
sizeable fraction of the population in major industrialized countries consists
of hand-to-mouth consumers. They distinguish between two types of them,
the "poor hand-to-mouth" with neither liquid nor illiquid wealth, which can
be understood as the rule-of-thumb households in e.g. Gali et al. (2007)
and the "wealthy hand-to-mouth" who own no liquid wealth but a large
amount of illiquid wealth, like houses. The impatient collateral constrained
households in our model own houses but do not hold any other assets and
hence can be understood as "wealthy hand to mouth". Kaplan et al. (2014)
gure out that the population share of the "wealthy" is twice as large as the
share of the "poor hand-to-mouth" in the US and argue that former should
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be incorporated in models analyzing scal policy to have an undistorted
view of the e¤ects of scal stimuli on aggregate consumption. Finally, there
are some studies that analyze government spending in frameworks with col-
lateral constrained households (e.g. Khan and Reza (2013), Andres et al.,
2015), but these do not consider the possibility of the collateral constraint
to become slack.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, the model
framework is described. In section 4.3, we calibrate the model to US data,
describe the simulation of representative expansion and recession scenarios,
and discuss the results. Moreover, we provide some robustness checks at the
end of this section. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 The Model
In this section, we present the model. The household sector consists of two
types of agents, patient and impatient ones. While the former will save,
the latter will be borrowers in equilibrium. As in Iacoviello (2005), their
borrowing is collateralized by housing due to costly enforcement of loans.
In the production sector, we introduce monopolistic competition of retailers
and Calvo (1983) price setting leading to price stickiness. The treasury
nances its expenditures by collecting lump sum taxes and issuing one-
period bonds. Further, we consider a scal rule that inhibits a feedback of
public debt to taxes. Finally, the central bank sets its policy rate according
to a Taylor-type feedback rule.
4.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households consisting of two types, patient (indexed
with p) and impatient ones (indexed with i) with discount factors 1 > p >
i > 0. Both types of households derive utility from consumption c;t,
housing h;t and disutility from labor n;t ( = i; p) and maximize the innite
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sum of expected utility. Their objective is given by
E0
1X
t=0
;tu(c;t; h;t; n;t). (4.1)
We consider the following CRRA-specication of the utility function
u(c;t; h;t; n;t) = zct
c1 
c
;t
1  c + z
h
t 
h
h1 
h
;t
1  h   
n
n1+
n
;t
1 + n
, (4.2)
where zc(h)t is a (housing) demand shock with log

z
c(h)
t

= c(h) log

z
c(h)
t 1

+
"
c(h)
t , where "
c(h)
t  n:i:d:

0; 2c(h)

and 0 < c(h) < 1. Here, 
c(h) denotes
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
(housing) and n the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, h and
n are weights on housing and labor in the utility function. We assume that
c;h;n > 0 and h;n > 0.
Let the population share of the patient households be 0 < s < 1. We
rst describe the problem of a representative patient household and then
the one of a representative impatient household.
Patient Households In equilibrium patient households are the savers
in our model. They can invest their savings in physical capital ip;t, hold
government bonds bGp;t, and lend to impatient borrowers bp;t. The rental
rate for physical capital is denoted by rkt , the gross bond yield by R
G
t , and
the gross loan rate by Rt. The budget constraint of a patient household p
in period t in real terms is given by
cp;t + ip;t + (1 + h) ph;thp;t + b
G
p;t + bp;t + p;t
= ph;thp;t 1 +
RGt 1
t
bGp;t 1 +
Rt 1
t
bp;t 1 + wtnp;t + rkt kp;t + p;t (4.3)
where the left hand side contains expenditures for consumption cp;t, in-
vestment in physical capital ip;t, purchase of a new house (1 + h) ph;thp;t,
and lump sum taxes, p;t. The real price of housing is denoted with ph;t.
Following Bajari et al. (2013), we assume that housing is associated with
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transaction costs that are proportional to the value of the newly purchased
house.2 Moreover, we assume that housing entails linear maintenance costs
as in Cocco (2004). For simplicity, both of these costs are pooled in the
term hph;thp;t.
On the right hand side of (4.3), we have the revenues from selling the old
house at the current price ph;thp;t 1, revenues from bond holdings
RGt 1
t
bGp;t 1,
repayment of previous period loans Rt 1t bp;t 1, with t being the ination
rate, labor income wtnp;t, capital income rkt kp;t, and prots of rms and
retailers p;t since patient households are the owners of rms and retailers.
Physical capital is due to investment adjustment costs and accumulates
according to
kp;t+1 = ip;t   i (ip;t   ip;t 1)
2
ip
+ (1  k) kp;t, (4.4)
where ip is the steady state value of investment in physical capital of a
patient household, k > 0 its depreciation rate, and i > 0 a parameter
reecting the size of these costs.
A patient household chooses the values of cp;t, hp;t, np;t, ip;t, bGp;t and
bp;t to maximize (4.1) subject to the budget constraint (4.3) and the capital
accumulation equation (4.4), leading to the rst order conditions
uhp;t = u
c
p;tph;t (1 + h)  pEtucp;t+1ph;t+1 (4.5)
 unp;t = wtucp;t (4.6)
t = 
pt+1 (1  k)  pucp;t+1rkt+1 (4.7)
ucp;t = t

2i
ip
(ip;t   ip;t 1)  1

  pt+1
2i (ip;t+1   ip;t)
ip
(4.8)
ucp;t = 
pEt
RGt
t+1
ucp;t+1 = 
pEt
Rt
t+1
ucp;t+1, (4.9)
with uj;t =
@u
@j;t denoting the marginal utility with respect to the argu-
ment (j = c; h; n) and t being the multiplier on (4.4).
2For further examples for nonconvex housing adjustment costs see e.g. Flavin and
Nakagawa (2008) and Iacoviello and Pavan (2013).
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Equation (4.5) describes housing demand of a patient household. Mar-
ginal costs in terms of forgone consumption today ucp;tph;t (1 + h) equal
marginal utility the house delivers today uhp;t plus the discounted benet
achieved from selling the house tomorrow in terms of consumption tomor-
row pEtucp;t+1ph;t+1. Equation (4.6) describes labor supply of a patient
household and equates the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure
uni;t
uci;t
to the real wage rate wt. Equation (4.7) and (4.8)
describe optimal investment in physical capital and the equations in (4.9)
are Euler equations for bonds and loans.
Impatient Households Since impatient households value current con-
sumption more than patient ones, they will become borrowers in equilibrium
and do not hold any assets. When a household i borrows in real terms an
amount bi;t 1 > 0 in period t   1, it has to pay back Rt 1t bi;t 1 in period
t. Following Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a), an impatient household i can
only borrow up to a limit given by
bi;t  b bi;t 1
t
+

1  b
 ph;t+1hi;tt+1
Rt
, (4.10)
where 0 < b < 1 denotes inertia in the borrowing limit and  the (ex-
ogenous) pledgeable fraction of housing. This specication of the collateral
constraint is more exible and captures the sluggish response of mortgage
debt to house prices (see Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015a).
An impatient household i has expenditures for consumption ci;t, and
new housing (1 + h) ph;thi;t, pays back previous period loans
Rt 1
t
bi;t 1,
and lumps sum taxes  i;t. On the income side, it has revenues from selling
the old house ph;thi;t 1, labor income wtni;t, and a new loan bi;t. Hence, the
budget constraint of an impatient household i reads
ci;t + (1 + h) ph;thi;t +
Rt 1
t
bi;t 1 +  i;t = ph;thi;t 1 + bi;t + wtni;t. (4.11)
An impatient household i chooses the values of ci;t, hi;t, ni;t, and bi;t to
maximize (4.1) subject to the collateral constraint (4.10) and the budget
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constraint (4.11), leading to the rst order conditions
uhi;t = u
c
i;tph;t (1 + h)  iEtuci;t+1ph;t+1 (4.12)
 !t

1  b
 ph;t+1t+1
Rt
 uni;t = wtuci;t (4.13)
uci;t = 
iEt
Rt
t+1
uci;t+1 + !t   b
i!t+1
t+1
(4.14)
with !t being the multiplier on the collateral constraint and the comple-
mentary slackness conditions
!t

 bi;t + b bi;t 1
t
+

1  b
 ph;t+1hi;tt+1
Rt

= 0;
 bi;t + b bi;t 1
t
+

1  b
 ph;t+1hi;tt+1
Rt
 0; !t  0:
Equation (4.12) describes housing demand of an impatient household, again
equating marginal costs with marginal utility but with the additional term
!t
 
1  b ph;t+1t+1Rt compared to a patient household. This term stems
from the collateral constraint and reects the additional benet of housing
to borrowers resulting from its usage as collateral for loans, which we label as
the "collateral value" of housing. Equation (4.13) describes labor supply of
an impatient household and (4.14) is a modied Euler equation for borrowing
accounting for the collateral constraint. Furthermore, the transversality
conditions must hold.
Finally, inserting (4.9) in (4.14) delivers the following steady state con-
dition under which the collateral constraint is binding
! = uci
1  ip
1  b i
> 0.
Since uci > 0 and the nominator of the quotient is positive because of 
p > i
and the denominator as well due to  > 1 > i and 0 < b < 1, the collateral
constraint is binding in the steady state.
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4.2.2 Firms
A continuum of perfectly competitive identical rms indexed with j pro-
duce the intermediate good according to IOj;t = z
p
t n

j;tk
1 
j;t , where  2
(0; 1) and zpt is a productivity shock with log (z
p
t ) = p log
 
zpt 1

+ "pt and
"pt  n:i:d:
 
0; 2p

and 0 < p < 1. The rm j hires labor nj;t at the real
wage rate wt and physical capital kj;t at the rate rkt to produce its output
IOj;t, which it sells to the retailers at the price PJ;t. Hence a rm j solves
maxPJ;tz
p
t n

j;tk
1 
j;t  Ptwtnj;t Ptrkt kj;t leading to the rst order conditions
PJ;tz
p
t n
 1
j;t k
1 
j;t = Ptwt (4.15)
PJ;tz
p
t n

j;t (1  ) k j;t = Ptrkt (4.16)
and to zero prots.
A continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed with k
buy intermediate goods at the price PJ;t, repackage them according to IOt =
1R
0
IOj;tdj, di¤erentiate them into yk;t = IOk;t and sell the distinct goods yk;t
at the price Pk;t to perfectly competitive bundlers. They bundle them to
the nal good yt =

1R
0
y
 1

k;t dk
 
 1
, where  > 1, which is sold at the price
Pt. Hence a retailer k sets its price Pk;t facing the demand function yk;t =
(Pk;t=Pt)
  yt and taking PJ;t as given. Following Calvo (1983), we assume
that each period only a fraction 1  of retailers is allowed to change its price.
The other fraction  2 [0; 1) indexes the price to the steady state ination
rate according to Pk;t = Pk;t 1. Dening eZt = P k;t=Pt with the optimal
price of retailers P k;t, the optimal real price can be written recursively aseZt =  1Z1;t=Z2;t, with Z1;t = c cp;t ytmct + pEt  t+1  Z1;t+1 and Z2;t =
c 
c
p;t yt+
pEt
 t+1

 1
Z2;t+1 where mct =
PJ;t
Pt
denotes real marginal costs
of retailers (for details see Appendix 4.5.1).
Due to perfectly competitive bundlers the aggregate price level Pt for
nal goods is given by P 1 t =
1R
0
P 1 k;t dk (zero prot condition) and can
be written as P 1 t = (1  )

P k;t
1 
+ 1 P 1 t 1 , 1 = (1  ) eZ1 t +
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
 
t

 1 (see Appendix 4.5.1). Moreover, aggregate output is given by yt =
zpt n

t k
1 
t
vt
where vt =
1R
0
(Pk;t=Pt)
  dk is a measure of price dispersion, which
can be written recursively as vt = (1  ) eZ t +   t  vt 1 (see Appendix
4.5.1). Prots of retailers are distributed to patient households in a lump-
sum way.
4.2.3 Public Sector
The treasury has (exogenous) expenditures which it nances by collecting
lump sum taxes and issuing one-period bonds, which are held by patient
households: bGt = sb
G
p;t. We assume that taxes are identical for both types
p;t =  i;t =  t. The government budget constraint hence reads
gt +
RGt 1bGt 1
t
= bGt +  t.
We consider the following scal rule
 t   
y
= 
bGt 1   bG
y
,
where 0 <  < 1 is the feedback parameter for the reaction of taxes to debt
and where variables without subscript denote steady state values of these
variables. Whenever previous periods debt di¤ers from its steady state level,
taxes will react. If, for instance, an increase in government spending leads
to an increase in debt, then the scal rule implies that taxes are raised to
stabilize debt. Hence, the larger  , the more of an increase in government
spending is tax nanced and the smaller  , the more of it is debt nanced.
Government spending evolves according to
log
gt
g
= g log
gt 1
g
+ "Gt ,
where g denotes the steady state value of government spending and "Gt 
n:i:d:
 
0; 2G

a government spending shock with 0 < g < 1 being the para-
meter for the persistence of this shock.
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The policy rate Rt is set by the central bank following a feedback rule
given by
Rt = (Rt 1)R (R)1 R (t=)(1 R) (yt=y)y(1 R) ,
where R > 1 is an average policy rate chosen by the central bank, R  0,
  0 and y  0.
4.2.4 Equilibrium
Factor markets clear according to nt = snp;t + (1  s)ni;t and kt = skp;t
and the credit market according to sbp;t = (1  s) bi;t. The consolidation
of budget constraints delivers the aggregate resource constraint yt = scp;t +
(1   s)ci;t + gt + sip;t + 	t with 	t denoting total housing transaction and
maintenance costs 	t = shph;thp;t + (1   s)hph;thi;t = hph;tH, where
H = shp;t + (1   s)hi;t and H is the x level of housing supply. The set
of equilibrium conditions is summarized and the equilibrium is dened in
Appendix 4.5.2.
4.3 Simulation
In this section, we analyze whether the model developed in the previous
section is capable of generating countercyclical government spending mul-
tipliers. To this end, we rst simulate expansion and recession scenarios
that are representative for the US. Given these scenarios, we can analyze
how the same government spending shock a¤ects GDP and other variables
depending on whether it occurs in an expansion or in a recession. Since
in an average expansion, in which the cyclical component of GDP rises by
2   2:5%, the collateral constraint becomes slack, this will potentially lead
to (large) di¤erences in expansion and recession multipliers. Throughout
our analysis, we use a toolkit for solving models with occasionally binding
constraints, OccBin, developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015b). Before
we come to the analysis, we rst calibrate the model to the US economy.
96
Table 4.1: Baseline Parameter Calibration.
Description Source/Target Parameter Value
Discount factor patient households G&I 2015a p 0:995
Discount factor impatient households G&I 2015a i 0:99
Pledgeable fraction of housing G&I 2015a  0:9
Share of the patient households G&I 2015a s 0:6
Inverse of Frisch elasticity G&I 2015a n 1
Inverse of IES in consumption G&I 2015a c 1
Inverse of IES in housing G&I 2015a h 1
Weight of housing in utility 	GDP = 2% 
h 0:05
Weight of labor in utility n = 0:33 n 9:5
Inertia borrowing constraint G&I 2015a b 0:5
Investment adjustment costs G&I 2015a i 5
Capital depreciation rate G&I 2015a k 0:025
Housing trans. & mainten. costs see text h 0:06
Production function G&I 2015a  2=3
Price rigidity G&I 2015a  0:9
Elasticity of substitution G&I 2015a  6
4.3.1 Calibration
Table 4.1 summarizes the baseline parameter calibration. One time period
is assumed to be a quarter and the total housing stock is normalized to
H = 1. In general, our calibration follows Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a).
First, we adopt the following parameters from their calibration. We set the
discount factor of patient households to p = 0:995, which together with a
gross quarterly steady state ination rate of  = 1:005 implies an annual
real interest rate of 2% or R = 1:01. The parameters of the utility function
are set to n = 1, implying a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 1, c = 1,
and h = 1 implying log utility in consumption and housing. We set the
pledgeable fraction of housing to  = 0:9, the capital depreciation rate to
k = 0:025 and " = 6 leading to a steady state mark-up of 20%. In line with
their calibration, we further set the labor share in production to  = 2=3.
Further parameters are set to values in the lines of the estimation results
of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a). The impatient households discount
factor is set to i = 0:99, the parameter for borrowing inertia to b = 0:5, the
investment adjustment cost parameter to i = 5 and the Calvo parameter
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to  = 0:9. Finally, we set the autocorrelation coe¢ cients of the shock
processes that are used for the simulation of expansions and recessions to
slightly smaller values than Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a) to ensure that
the reversion to the steady state does not take too long. Therefore, we set
h = 0:85, c = 0:7 and p = 0:7.
The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows. We set n = 9:5
such that total hours worked in the steady state is n = 0:33 and h = 0:05,
which leads to 	GDP = 2% in line with what we nd in the National Income
and Product Account (NIPA).3 The share of impatient households is set to
1   s = 0:4, which is in the range of what Kaplan et al. (2014) estimate
for the share of hand-to-mouth consumers in the US. We set h as follows.
Smith et al. (1988) estimate that housing transaction costs make up 8-10%
of the value of the house and Harding et al. (2007) nd for a sample from the
American Housing Survey average annual maintenance costs of 1.4% of the
houses value. Since maintenance costs always incur, but transaction costs
only when a transaction takes place, we set the parameter to a conservative
value of h = 0:06.
Further, we set the parameters of the policy rate rule to values that are
in the lines of what is typically used in the literature: R = 0:8,  = 1:5,
and y = 0:08. Following Canzoneri et al. (2015), we set the feedback pa-
rameter of the scal rule to  = 0:02. We set the steady state ratio of
government debt to annual GDP to 60% and of government spending to
GDP to 20% in line with US data. Finally, we estimate the persistence
parameter of the government spending shock for the time period that Guer-
rieri and Iacoviello (2015a) consider in their estimation, which is 1985Q1 to
2011Q4. The resulting point estimate from our regression of the HP-ltered
(with a smoothing parameter of 1600) government spending series on its
own lag is g = 0:76. This very close to 0:75, which is what Brückner and
Pappa (2012) nd as the average value of this parameter for several OECD
countries. The resulting 95% condence band from our regression for g is
3NIPA Tables 5.4.6.42 and 43 report values for real home improvements and brokers
commissions, respectively. On average, these expenditures made up about 2% of GDP for
the time period of 2007-2014.
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Figure 4.1: Simulation of Expansion and Recession Scenarios.
[0:63; 0:88], for which we will report multipliers in the robustness checks.
4.3.2 Simulating Expansions and Recessions
The analysis of countercyclical government spending multipliers requires
expansion and recession scenarios that are representative for the US. For
this, we estimate the average increase (fall) in GDP during expansions (re-
cessions) using an HP-ltered (with a smoothing parameter of 1600) GDP
series for the time period after World War II. We nd that on average the
cyclical component of GDP rose by 2 2:5% during expansions, whereas the
average drop during recessions was slightly larger. To avoid asymmetry in
the starting point of our analysis, we calibrate the shock series to match the
average expansion and use the same series of shocks with opposite sign for
the recession scenario.
Since, on the one hand, demand shocks and, on the other hand, sup-
ply shocks may lead to an expansion or a recession, we use both types of
shocks for the simulation of our representative scenarios. For the expansion
scenario, we consider positive innovations to the consumption and housing
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demand shocks as well as to the TFP shock between period 1 and 20 such
that GDP increases by 2.25%. For the recession scenario, we use the same
shock series, but with negative sign. Figure 4.1 illustrates our simulation of
expansions (solid line) and recessions (dashed line). It shows the reactions
of output, the multiplier on the collateral constraint, !t, hours worked, and
total consumption to the shock series. Except for the multiplier on the col-
lateral constraint, that shows the level of !t, the gure shows percentage
deviations of the variables from their steady state values.
In both scenarios, we see a comovement of aggregate variables. In the
expansion scenario, output, total hours worked, and total consumption in-
crease, while all three variables fall in the recession scenario. However, the
drops in the recession are slightly larger than the increases in the expansion,
although the shock series does not di¤er except for the sign. The reason
for this lies in the reaction of the multiplier !t. While the multiplier rises
strongly in the recession, its drop in the expansion is bounded by 0, which
is the point, where the collateral constraint becomes slack. As we can see,
in the expansion scenario the multiplier is stuck at 0, i.e. the collateral con-
straint is slack, from period 2 to 21. The fact that the collateral constraint
becomes slack in the expansion scenario leads to the slight asymmetry in
the reactions shown in Figure 4.1, but as we will see below it will inuence
multipliers considerably.4
4.3.3 Government Spending in Expansions and Recessions
Having simulated representative expansion and recession scenarios, we now
turn to the analysis of the e¤ectiveness of government spending depending
on in which of these two scenarios it occurs. For this, we impose a positive
government spending shock in the magnitude of 1% of its steady state value
on the one hand in the expansion and on the other hand in the recession
scenario. We then isolate the e¤ects of the government spending shock as
follows. First, we simulate an expansion without government spending (as
in the previous section) and denote the resulting path of any variable xt
4The asymmetric e¤ects of occasionally binding collateral constraints on macroeco-
nomic variables is studied in detail in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a).
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by xt;:gE . Then, we simulate an expansion with the government spending
shock and denote the resulting path of any variable xt by 
xt;gt
E . Finally,
we subtract the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the former simulation
from those of the latter. The resulting IRFs, given by xtE = 
xt;gt
E  xt;:gE ,
which are displayed by the solid lines in Figure 4.2, show the isolated e¤ects
of the government spending shock in the expansion scenario. We follow the
same procedure to obtain the e¤ects of the same government spending shock
in the recession scenario denoted by xtR = 
xt;gt
R  xt;:gR and shown by the
dashed lines in Figure 4.2.
First of all, in both scenarios, the government spending shock leads to
an increase in income, hours worked and wages. However, there are quali-
tative di¤erences. While in the expansion the government spending shock
increases income by 0.2%, hours worked by 0.3%, and wages by 0.4%, in
the recession the increases are larger: 0.32%, 0.48%, and 0.88%, respec-
tively. Moreover, in both scenarios, a patient households consumption falls,
whereas consumption and housing of an impatient household rise. While the
drop in a patient households consumption is almost the same in recessions
and expansions, the initial rise in an impatient households consumption
and housing stock is about 3 times larger in recessions. Further, in the re-
cession house prices slightly increase initially and then fall, while their fall
in the expansion is more pronounced. This is reected in the reaction of
borrowing. The increase or, at least, smaller drop in house prices together
with the larger increase in the housing stock of an impatient household lead
to an increase in borrowing in the recession, whereas borrowing falls in the
expansion. Total consumption, which is comprised of the consumption of
the two types, increases in the recession persistently, while in the expansion
it only rises slightly on impact and then falls. Finally, ination goes up in
both scenarios and after a small initial drop, the real interest rate increases
as well.
How can we explain these di¤erences? The intuition for this result is
that in the expansion scenario impatient households are less sensitive to
changes in disposable income since their collateral constraint is not bind-
ing. A slack collateral constraint means that the household is at its un-
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Figure 4.2: E¤ects of the same Government Spending Shock in the Expan-
sion (solid line) and in the Recession Scenario (dashed line).
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constrained optimum and hence largely insensitive to changes in disposable
income. Although the household could borrow more, if it wanted, it does
not so since this would be suboptimal. For the sake of argument, consider
the rst order condition (4.14) of impatient households with no inertia in the
borrowing limit, b = 0. For a slack collateral constraint, we get !t = 0 and
uci;t = 
iEt
Rt
t+1
uci;t+1, such that the marginal utility of current consumption
equals the expected discounted marginal utility of future consumption mul-
tiplied by the real interest rate. On the contrary, in the recession scenario,
impatient households nd themselves at their borrowing limit and thus at
their constrained optimum. This means that they consume less than they
would if they could borrow more. Therefore, in the recession, their decisions
are substantially a¤ected by their current disposable income. For a binding
collateral constraint, we have !t > 0 implying uci;t > 
iEt
Rt
t+1
uci;t+1, i.e.
the marginal utility of current consumption is larger than the expected dis-
counted marginal utility of future consumption multiplied by the real interest
rate. Therefore, in this state, an impatient household will increase current
consumption towards its unconstrained optimum, whenever it is possible.
We observe the following e¤ects on disposable income. First, a scal
shock raises wages as a consequence of price rigidity. Since aggregate de-
mand rises and prices are sticky, output and hence labor demand rise leading
to an increase in wages. This leads to a larger increase in consumption and
housing of impatient households in recessions because households are sensi-
tive to disposable income. Second, in recessions the higher housing stock of
impatient households together with an increase or, at least, a smaller drop
in house prices boosts the borrowing limit of impatient households, which
amplies and prolongs the initial stimulus. This is what we label as collat-
eral e¤ect. In contrast, in expansions, the borrowing limit even decreases
due to a large house price drop. Third, impatient households benet from
an unexpected increase in ination in response to the government spending
shock, which deates their debt. These changes in disposable income a¤ect
strongly the decisions of impatient households in recessions, while they are
largely insensitive to them in expansions.
More precisely, the mechanism behind the collateral e¤ect works as fol-
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lows. Due to the negative wealth e¤ect of expected future tax increases
implied by the government spending shock, Ricardian patient households
want to reduce consumption and housing. Housing supply, however, is xed
at H = 1 and held by the two types of households. Hence, housing of im-
patient households must increase in the same amount as housing of patient
households falls. How this reallocation takes place depends on the state of
the economy. Consider now the rst order condition describing impatient
householdshousing demand (4.12)
uhi;t = u
c
i;tph;t (1 + h)  iEtuci;t+1ph;t+1   !t

1  b
 ph;t+1t+1
Rt
:
In the expansion, where !t is zero, the last term in this equation, which re-
ects the value of housing stemming from the fact that it serves as collateral,
disappears. Impatient households are at their unconstrained optimum and
are not willing to change their housing stock unless a su¢ ciently large drop
in house prices occurs. Therefore, in the expansion, we observe a large house
price drop in combination with a small reallocation of housing. In contrast,
in the recession, impatient households, which are at their constrained op-
timum, are willing to increase their housing at the outset. The increase in
disposable income enables them to do so, which is why house prices initially
rise. Moreover, due to the additional collateral value of housing for !t > 0,
housing demand of impatient households is large, which is why the reallo-
cation is larger in the recession. In sum, these reactions of house prices and
housing stocks boost the borrowing limit of impatient households in reces-
sions, which in turn increases their consumption and housing and amplies
the initial stimulus.
Comparing Multipliers To gure out the quantitative di¤erences in
the e¤ectiveness of government spending in expansions and recessions, we
compute government spending multipliers (GSMs) for three horizons. Let
GSMj with j 2 fE;Rg denote the corresponding multiplier in the expansion
(E) or the recession (R) scenario. The government spending multiplier for
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Table 4.2: Government Spending Multipliers.
Multiplier Expansion GSME Recession GSMR
GSM I 1:04 1:60
GSM1Y 0:89 1:47
GSM2Y 0:74 1:18
the horizon T is then given by
GSMTj =
y
g
PT
t=1
yt
jPT
t=1 bgt ;
where ytj denotes the isolated e¤ect of government spending on GDP in
quarter t (see above), bgt denotes the deviation of government spending from
its steady state value in the same quarter, and yg is the steady state ratio
of GDP to government spending. For T = 1, we get the impact multiplier,
GSM I , which shows the e¤ect of government spending in the rst quarter.
For the longer horizons, we get cumulative government spending multipliers.
In particular, we consider the 1-year cumulative multiplier GSM1Yj , which
results from T = 4, and the 2-year cumulative multiplier GSM2Yj resulting
from T = 8.
Table 4.2 summarizes the resulting multipliers for our baseline calibra-
tion. The impact recession multiplier is considerably larger 1, GSM IR = 1:6,
while the impact expansion multiplier is about 1, GSM IE = 1:04. The
impact recession multiplier is thus 54% larger than the impact expansion
multiplier. This di¤erence becomes even larger in the subsequent periods,
which is reected in the di¤erence of cumulative multipliers. The 1-year and
2-year cumulative recession multipliers are still larger 1, GSM1YR = 1:47 and
GSM2YR = 1:18, whereas the cumulative expansion multipliers are notice-
ably smaller one, GSM1YE = 0:89 and GSM
2Y
E = 0:74. The di¤erence
between recession and expansion multipliers is 64% for the horizon of 1 year
and still 60% for 2 years.
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4.3.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present sensitivity analyses concerning parameters that
have been shown to be important for the e¤ectiveness of scal policy. First,
we vary the persistence of the government spending shock, g, for which our
regression provides a 95% condence interval of [0:63; 0:88]. Therefore, we
consider how varying g between 0:6 and 0:9 a¤ects multipliers. Second, we
consider how a variation of  , i.e. tax vs. debt nancing of government
spending, a¤ects multipliers. Third, we provide multipliers for a range of
the share of impatient households reaching from 25% to 40%, which is the
range estimated by Kaplan et al. (2014) for the share of hand-to-mouth
consumers in the US. Fourth, we vary the pledgeable fraction of housing,
, between 0.7 and the maximum of 1. Finally, we consider a variation of
the Calvo parameter, , within a range that spans 0:75, which is typically
used in the literature and 0:92, which is the exact estimate of Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2015a).
The results of our robustness checks are plotted in Figure 4.3. In each
row of Figure 4.3, we plot the multipliers resulting from the variation of one
particular variable, holding all other variables as in the baseline calibration.
Again, solid lines depict expansion multipliers and dashed lines recession
multipliers. The left panels show impact multipliers, the middle panels
cumulative multipliers for 1 year and the right panels for 2 years.
Persistence of Government Spending The rst row of Figure 4.3
shows multipliers resulting from a variation of g. Consistent with what
Gali et al. (2007) report, we nd that multipliers are smaller, the larger the
persistence of the government spending shock is. However, over the whole
range we consider, the di¤erences between recession and expansion multipli-
ers are large. Since the initial shock to government spending is unexpected
and the process is known once a shock has appeared, g determines how
much of the total increase in g is unexpected and how much of it is antic-
ipated. The larger g is, the larger is the proportion of the total increase
in g that is anticipated. Therefore, the negative wealth e¤ect is larger for
higher persistence. This is why the multipliers fall in the persistence of gov-
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Figure 4.3: Robustness Checks: Each row shows impact, 1-year, and 2-
year cumulative multipliers in recessions and expansions for a parameter
variation.
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ernment spending. In contrast, for a low persistence, e.g. g = 0:6, the
negative wealth e¤ect is small and outweighed by the positive e¤ects on
disposable income and the collateral e¤ect described before.
To make this point more clear, consider Figure 4.4, which plots multipli-
ers for g = 0, i.e. for a government spending shock process with no persis-
tence at all. Since g also determines the total size of the government spend-
ing shock, we impose a series of unexpected shocks with "Gt = 0:01 (0:76)t 1
for t = 1; :::; 12, which mimics the shock process in the baseline calibration
and hence makes the two scenarios better comparable. The impact recession
and expansion multipliers are slightly smaller for the shock process without
persistence, while cumulative multipliers are considerably larger, especially
in recessions. The cumulative recession multipliers without anticipation are
GSM1YR = 1:93 and GSM
2Y
R = 1:85, whereas in the baseline calibration
with g = 0:76 they are quite smaller: GSM
1Y
R = 1:47 and GSM
2Y
R = 1:18.
As mentioned before, when there is no anticipation, the negative wealth
e¤ect is small and the positive e¤ect on impatient households comes to bear,
which leads to the hump-shaped pattern in many of the IRFs in Figure
4.4. In particular, house prices show a hump-shaped reaction and increase
persistently for this shock process due to the hump-shaped reaction of wages.
Thus, the collateral e¤ect and the amplication are more pronounced since
the increase in the borrowing limit is larger. The conclusion of this exercise
is that the less of an increase in government spending is anticipated, the
more e¤ective the scal stimulus is.
Tax vs. Debt Financing The second row of Figure 4.3 shows multipliers
resulting from a variation of the debt feedback parameter in the scal rule,
 . Multipliers are smaller, the larger  is, i.e. the more of an increase
in government spending is tax nanced. Nevertheless, as can be seen in
Figure 4.3, the di¤erence between recession and expansion multipliers for
the whole range of  is quite large. Multipliers fall in  because higher
taxes reduce ceteris paribus current disposable income of impatient house-
holds, which dampens their reactions that lead to large multipliers. Hence,
the timing of taxation is not irrelevant in our model due to the binding
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Figure 4.4: Robustness Checks: No persistence in government spending:
g = 0. For a better comparability, we reproduce the government spending
shock of the baseline calibration with unexpected shocks in each period.
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collateral constraint, which implies a higher marginal utility of current con-
sumption. Canzoneri et al. (2015) nd as well that multipliers are larger
when government spending is debt nanced based on a similar mechanism.
Share of Patient Households The third row of Figure 4.3 shows multi-
pliers resulting from a variation of the share of patient households, s, reach-
ing from 0:6 to 0:75 since Kaplan et al. (2014) estimate a range of 25  40%
for the share of hand-to-mouth consumers in the US. We observe that mul-
tipliers fall in s, but even for the largest value of s = 0:75, we observe a
di¤erence in expansion and recession multipliers in Figure 4.3. The larger
the share of patient Ricardian households, the more pronounced is the nega-
tive wealth e¤ect in the aggregate. On the other hand, the smaller the share
of impatient households, the fewer households are sensitive to changes in
disposable income and hence the weaker is the positive e¤ect on multipliers
in the aggregate. Therefore, multipliers are larger, the larger the share of
impatient households is. Consistent with our ndings, Gali et al. (2007) nd
that multipliers are higher, the larger the share of rule-of-thumb households
in their model is.
Pledgeable Fraction of Housing The fourth row of Figure 4.3 shows
the multipliers resulting from a variation of . We see that for higher 
recession multipliers increase and the di¤erence in recession and expansion
multipliers becomes larger. Over the whole range for , we have considerable
di¤erences between expansion and recession multipliers. A higher pledgeable
fraction of housing implies a higher marginal collateral value of a house and
hence higher borrowing. This amplies the positive e¤ects on impatient
households and multipliers are larger for larger . Andres et al. (2015) nd
as well larger multipliers for a higher level of private debt.
Price Stickiness The last row of Figure 4.3 shows the multipliers re-
sulting from a variation of the Calvo parameter . Here, we see that the
higher the level of price stickiness is, the larger multipliers are. Again, we
see considerable di¤erences in the multipliers for the whole range of  we
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consider. Multipliers increase in  because the initial wage increase that
triggers the positive e¤ect on impatient households is larger, the smaller the
fraction of rms that can adjust prices is. The larger wage increase leads to
a larger increase in impatient householdsconsumption, housing, and bor-
rowing. Hence the higher , the stronger is this positive e¤ect on impatient
households, which outweighs the negative wealth e¤ect on patient ones. Gali
et al. (2007) nd similar results for a variation of the Calvo parameter.
In summary, for all variations for the key parameters considered, the
di¤erences between expansion and recession multipliers remain large and
the mechanisms leading to these di¤erences are robust.
4.4 Conclusion
Recent empirical literature suggests that government spending multipliers
are countercyclical, i.e. large in recessions and small in expansions. While
empirical literature on this topic is growing, theoretical work is rare. In
this chapter, we try to contribute to ll this gap. We provide a theoretical
model based on occasionally binding collateral constraints that illustrates
a mechanism leading to countercyclical government spending multipliers.
Based on this framework, we quantify the di¤erences between multipliers
in recessions and expansions. In our framework, collateral constraints bind
in recessions and become slack in expansions. Our model, calibrated to
the US, generates impact recession multipliers of 1:6 and impact expansion
multipliers of 1:04. Moreover, the one year (two years) cumulative multiplier
is 1:47 (1:18) in recessions and 0:89 (0:74) in expansions. Hence, we observe
large di¤erences in recession and expansion multipliers on impact as well as
for longer horizons.
The intuition for this result is that in the expansion scenario impatient
households are largely insensitive to changes in disposable income since their
collateral constraint is not binding and they are at their unconstraint op-
timum. On the contrary, in the recession scenario, impatient households
nd themselves at their borrowing limit and thus at their constrained op-
timum. Therefore, their decisions are substantially a¤ected by changes in
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their disposable income. The increase in wages, the implied higher borrow-
ing limit, and the unexpected increase in ination let impatient households
increase their consumption in recessions, while their reaction is much smaller
in expansions.
We provide several robustness checks and nd that for a large range for
key variables the di¤erences in recession and expansion multipliers remain
considerably large. Finally, we nd that a scal stimulus is more e¤ective,
the less of it is anticipated.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Details of the FirmsProblem
RetailersPrice
The price setting problem of a retailer reads
@
@Pk;t
Et
( 1X
s=0
sqt;t+s (
sPk;t   PJ;t+s)

Pk;t
Pt+s
 
yt+s
)
= 0
with the stochastic discount factor qt;t+s = (p)
sEt
c 
c
p;t+s
c 
c
p;t
Pt
Pt+s
leading to the
rst order condition for the optimal price P k;t
P k;t =

  1
Et
1P
s=0
sqt;t+s (
s)  P t+syt+sPJ;t+s
Et
1P
s=0
sqt;t+s (s)
1  P t+syt+s
. (4.17)
Inserting qt;t+s = (p)
sEt
c 
c
p;t+s
c 
c
p;t
Pt
Pt+s
and marginal costs of retailers given by
mct =
PJ;t
Pt
, (4.17) can be written as
P k;t =

  1
Et
1P
s=0
(p)s c 
c
p;t+s (
s)  P t+syt+smct+s
Et
1P
s=0
(p)s c 
c
p;t+s (
s)1  P  1t+s yt+s
. (4.18)
We dene eZt = P k;t=Pt such that we can rewrite the denominator and the
numerator of (4.18) recursively as eZt =  1Z1;t=Z2;t, with Z1;t = c cp;t ytmct+
pEt
 t+1


Z1;t+1 and Z2;t = c
 c
p;t yt + 
pEt
 t+1

 1
Z2;t+1.
Aggregate Price Level
The aggregate price level Pt for nal goods is given by P 1 t =
1R
0
P 1 k;t dk
due to perfectly competitive bundlers (zero prot condition). Since all retail
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prices were set according to (4.17) in the past, we can write this as
P 1 t =
1Z
0
P 1 k;t dk = (1  )
1X
s=0
s
 
sP k;t s
1 
= (1  )  P k;t1  + 1 P 1 t 1 .
Hence, the aggregate price level is given by
P 1 t = (1  )
 
P k;t
1 
+ 1 P 1 t 1 ) 1 = (1  ) eZ1 t +  t  1 .
Price Dispersion
With the assumption that there is no initial price dispersion, we can write
vt with P k;t being the optimal price set by the price adjusting rms at time
t as
vt = (1  )
 
P k;t=Pt
 
+ (1  )   P k;t 1=Pt 
+(1  ) 2  2P k;t 2=Pt  + :::
= (1  )
1X
l=0
l

lP k;t l=Pt
 
= (1  )
1X
l=0
l

lP k;t l=Pt l
 
(Pt l=Pt) 
= (1  )
1X
l=0
l

l
  eZ t l lY
s=1
t+1 s
with eZt = P k;t=Pt and 1P
l=1
lQ
s=1
t+1 s = t + tt 1 + tt 1t 1 + ::: =
Pt 1
Pt
 
+

Pt 1
Pt
 Pt 2
Pt 1
 
| {z }
(Pt 2=Pt) 
+

Pt 1
Pt
 Pt 2
Pt 1
 Pt 3
Pt 2
 
| {z }
(Pt 3=Pt) 
+::: =
1P
l=1

Pt l
Pt
 
. Taking di¤erences, we can write vt in a more compact recursive
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way:
vt    tvt 1 = (1  )
1X
l=0
l

l
  eZ t l lY
s=1
t+1 s
   t (1  )
1X
l=0
l

l
  eZ t 1 l lY
s=1
t s
= (1  ) eZ t + (1  )   eZ t 1t + (1  ) 2 2 eZ t 2tt 1 + :::
  (1  )   eZ t 1t   (1  ) 2 2 eZ t 2tt 1   :::
, vt = (1  ) eZ t +  t  vt 1.
4.5.2 Equilibrium
Denition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences fcp;t;
hp;t; np;t; kp;t; ip;t; ci;t; hi;t; ni;t; ph;t; wt; t; !t; bi;t; Rt; nt; mct; eZt; Z1;t;
Z2;t; yt; vt; gt; b
G
t ;  t; r
k
t ; kt; tg1t=0 satisfying the optimality conditions of
patient households
uhp;t = u
c
p;tph;t (1 + h)  pEtucp;t+1ph;t+1; (4.19)
 unp;t = wtucp;t; (4.20)
kp;t+1 = ip;t   i (ip;t   ip;t 1)
2
ip
+ (1  k) kp;t; (4.21)
t = 
pt+1 (1  k)  pucp;t+1rkt+1; (4.22)
ucp;t = t

2i
ip
(ip;t   ip;t 1)  1

  pt+1
2i
ip
(ip;t+1   ip;t) ;(4.23)
ucp;t = 
pEt
Rt
t+1
ucp;t+1; (4.24)
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impatient households
uhi;t = u
c
i;tph;t (1 + h)  iEtuci;t+1ph;t+1 (4.25)
 !t

1  b
 ph;t+1t+1
Rt
 uni;t = wtuci;t (4.26)
uci;t = 
iEt
Rt
t+1
uci;t+1 + !t   b
i!t+1
t+1
(4.27)
ci;t + (1 + h) ph;thi;t +
Rt 1
t
bi;t 1 +  t (4.28)
= ph;thi;t 1 + bi;t + wtni;t
bi;t = 
b bi;t 1
t
+

1  b
 ph;t+1hi;tt+1
Rt
if !t > 0; (4.29)
or bi;t < b
bi;t 1
t
+

1  b
 ph;t+1hi;tt+1
Rt
if !t = 0; (4.30)
rms
yt =
zpt n

t k
1 
t
vt
(4.31)
nt = snp;t + (1  s)ni;t; (4.32)
kt = skp;t; (4.33)
wt = mctz
p
t n
 1
t k
1 
t ; (4.34)
rkt = mctz
p
t n

t (1  ) k t ; (4.35)eZt = 
  1Z1;t=Z2;t; (4.36)
Z1;t = u
c
p;tytmct + 
pEt
t+1


Z1;t+1; (4.37)
Z2;t = u
c
p;tyt + 
pEt
t+1

 1
Z2;t+1; (4.38)
vt = (1  ) eZ t + vt 1 t  ; (4.39)
1 = (1  ) eZ1 t +  t  1 ; (4.40)
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the public sector conditions
gt +
Rt 1bGt 1
t
= bGt +  t; (4.41)
 t   
y
= 
bGt 1   bG
y
; (4.42)
log
gt
g
= g log
gt 1
g
+ "Gt , (4.43)
Rt = (Rt 1)R (R)1 R (t=)(1 R) (yt=y)y(1 R) ; (4.44)
the market clearing conditions
yt = scp;t + (1  s)ci;t + gt + sip;t + hph;tH (4.45)
H = shp;t + (1  s)hi;t (4.46)
and transversality conditions, with uj;t =
@u
@j;t denoting marginal utility with
respect to j 2 (c; h; n) of type  2 (p; i), given the xed housing supply H > 0,
	t = shph;thp;t+(1 s)hph;thi;t = hph;tH, initial values bG 1 > 0; k 1 > 0;
 1 > 0; v 1 = 1, and the exogenous processes for fzht ; zct ; zpt g1t=0 and i.i.d.
innovations with mean zero f"ht ; "ct ; "pt ; "Gt g1t=0. Herein, variables without
subscript denote their steady state values.
4.5.3 Steady State
The deterministic steady state follows from the equilibrium dened above.
The steady state value of each variable is denoted without time index.
We can reduce the equilibrium conditions for the steady state as follows.
First, consider the rms optimality condition eZt =  1Z1;t=Z2;t; where
Z1 =
c 
c
p y mc
1 p and Z2 =
c 
c
p y
1 p in the steady state. Hence, we get eZ =  1mc
and with the steady state mark-up of  1 ) mc =  1 ) eZ = 1. From
this, we get v = (1 )
eZ 
1  = 1. Moreover, for a given steady state ination
rate  and we get R = p and r
k = 1p   1 + k. The values of fcp; hp; np;
ci; hi; ni; ph; w; !; bi; y; n; k; g that satisfy the conditions (4.47)-(4.60)
mark the steady state of the model:
117
uhp = u
c
pph (1 + h   p) (4.47)
 unp = wucp (4.48)
uhi = u
c
iph
 
1 + h   i
  ! 1  bphp (4.49)
 uni = wuci (4.50)
! = uci
1  R i
1  b i
(4.51)
bi =
1  b
1  b
phhi
p (4.52)
ci + hphhi +  = bi

1  R


+ wni (4.53)
n = snp + (1  s)ni (4.54)

  1w = n
 1k1  (4.55)

  1r
k = n (1  ) k  (4.56)
y = nk1  (4.57)
g = bG(1  R
G

) +  (4.58)
y = scp + (1  s)ci + g + sip + hphH (4.59)
H = shp + (1  s)hi (4.60)
with bG = 4 0:6y, g = 0:2y and uj = @u@j , given parameter values for p,
i and  ensuring a binding collateral constraint in the steady state.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis has presented three essays that emphasize the role of housing
for the conduct of monetary and scal policy. In the presence of nancial
market imperfections, private debt has to be collateralized, which is typically
done by pledging houses. In each chapter of this thesis, we have used models,
which incorporate household sectors consisting of lenders and borrowers who
face a collateral constraint that ties their borrowing limit to the value of their
houses.
In chapter 2, we have shown that housing subsidies, which can be ob-
served in several industrialized countries, are optimal in the presence of col-
lateral constrained households. Chapter 3 has analyzed the macroeconomic
e¤ects of the Feds MBS purchases and has shown that these had consid-
erable e¤ects on economic activity and prices providing a rationale for this
new type of monetary policy measure. Chapter 4 has provided a theoretical
framework in which collateral constraints are occasionally binding, which
leads to government spending multipliers that are large in recessions and
small in expansions consistent with recent empirical evidence.
In our frameworks, housing wealth a¤ects consumption of collateral con-
strained borrowers and thereby aggregate consumption. Hence, whenever
a policy a¤ects housing wealth of borrowers, this will amplify the e¤ects of
this policy measure. Since borrowers have a high marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth, this amplication may become large. We have seen
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that this housing wealth/collateral channel played a signicant role for the
e¤ects in chapters 3 and 4.
To summarize, we have shown that accounting for the role of housing
in borrower-lender frameworks with nancial market imperfections, has im-
portant implications for monetary and scal policy. The increased interest
of researchers on the interplay of housing and the macroeconomy in recent
years leads to various new frameworks incorporating housing, which help
to better understand the role that housing plays for the macroeconomy.
The analyses within this theses suggest, that analyzing the implications of
housing for other policy questions within these new frameworks may deliver
interesting insights.
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